China and Russia in UN Security Council R2P Debates

Beijing and Moscow both have exerted significant influence on the evolution of the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), which has come to the forefront of the global human rights agenda in recent years. What are the similarities and differences between the two states in those debates, and what are the reasons behind them?
ZHENG CHEN and HANG YIN compare the rhetoric of the two countries in debates relevant to R2P at the UN Security Council (UNSC). The primary subjects are thematic debates on protection of civilians in armed conflicts, in which R2P is a key topic, and debates on the Syrian crisis, the most controversial recent issue involving the application of R2P.
“As discourses reflect and construct social reality, probing these questions will help us to a better understanding of the two states’ R2P policies within a broader strategic context,” the authors write in ‘China and Russia in R2P debates at the UN Security Council’, published in International Affairs.
The positions of China and Russia towards R2P are similar, expressing support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under the third pillar. For both Beijing and Moscow, safeguarding domestic political security is a predominant concern. They strongly opposed external interventions that could lead to regime change and state fragmentation, especially in those regions close to their borders or in their partner states.
In other cases, both states were ready to adopt a conditionally cooperative approach. They are very keen to preserve their role as ‘permission givers’ for international actions and to participate actively in relevant discussions to shape the further development of R2P.
The two states have found each other useful to lean on during some difficult situations, CHEN and YIN write. In the case of Syria, for example, they used each other as diplomatic cover. That is, however, a far cry from a looming ‘partnership of spoilers’.
“The notion of a Sino-Russia bloc obscures the subtle differences between the two. While Beijing appears to prefer a more cautious approach, Moscow is inclined to adopt increasingly aggressive stances on issues such as the Syrian conflict.”
CHEN and YIN argue that many of these differences between the two arise from China’s and Russia’s divergent status prospects, and their correspondingly different ways of signaling their Great Power status. While the power gap between China and the United States is still large, Beijing is confident of its rising status prospect.
“For Beijing, the future seems bright and so it can afford to wait, a cautious and patient approach promising better long-term pay-offs. It thus focuses on ensuring favorable external conditions for its internal development and preventing any external efforts to contain or disrupt its continued rise.”
Beijing has adopted an assertive posture from time to time in the past few years and its potential as a challenger is real; but we should also note the limitations of Chinese assertiveness as well as the continuity of its foreign strategy, the authors state. As long as the Chinese core interests of political security and territorial sovereignty are not adversely affected, Beijing is inclined to follow a course of cooperation and conflict avoidance in its diplomacy. In this process, China has developed a moderate discourse on R2P.
Meanwhile, Russia is in a much more precarious position and perceives its status more from a frame of loss. “It is the successor to a failed superpower and is encountering great difficulties in overcoming a systemic decline. Moscow’s recent assertiveness stems from its frustration at not being treated as an equal, and its consequent intention to signal its resolve to recover at least some of its former prestige,” the authors state.
Russia is very sensitive to events that challenge its status and is risk-prone in countering perceived threats. Amid its continuing concern about ‘losing ground’ to the West in its traditional sphere of influence, Moscow’s attitude to risk prompts it to play the role of a loud and visible dissenter on the international stage, and R2P became a victim to this approach. The R2P debates thus provide a revealing prism through which to analyze the two countries’ foreign strategies. In sum, although the two regimes do instinctively look to each other for mutual support so as to avoid isolation at the UNSC, Beijing and Moscow do not have an identical outlook on issues such as the application of R2P.
The current partnership between China and Russia is not without its difficulties. Washington’s dual containment strategy against both has contributed greatly to their current rapprochement. For the foreseeable future, Moscow and Beijing will regard Washington as their shared principal adversary, and each will treat the other as a main partner. However, both also know well the limitations of what the other can offer, since they have different objectives and agendas. While Russia is anxious about becoming overly dependent on China, Beijing is worried about being dragged into unnecessary conflicts which would jeopardize China’s peaceful rise.
The continued success of this partnership depends on both sides’ ability to manage their underlying differences. As they have divergent perceptions of their own status prospects, the temporary synergy between the two states on R2P debates does not necessarily set a norm for the future.