Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council

The Politicization of the Genocide Label

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide notes a finding of genocide requires member-states and competent organs of the UN to prevent and punish such acts. However, despite this obligation, and the fact that the Convention provides a detailed definition of what acts constitute genocide, the use of euphemisms in referring to situations involving the apparent commission of genocide remains widespread.
“When an atrocity is not recognized as a genocide, a dangerous precedent is set for future acts of semantic avoidance, and the ability of areas affected by genocide to recover is severely hampered, MICHELLE E. RINGROSE writes in the journal Genocide Studies and Prevention.
The UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes asserts that past acts of genocide, serious human rights violations, and crimes against humanity are prominent indicators of a heightened risk of future genocides. This claim is supported by research demonstrating that a history of violence and aggression makes the engagement in future violent acts as a means of responding to conflict and hostility more likely, RINGROSE states in her article titled ‘The Politicization of the Genocide Label: Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council’.
“Given that governments which deny genocide are three times more likely to commit another genocide, international recognition is central to maintaining peace and security.”
The author explores the ways in which language is used by P5 nations in the Security Council to avoid genocide recognition using the Srebrenica genocide as a case study. Srebrenica is an ideal case study to examine such rhetorical positioning for a number of reasons, she notes. First, the atrocities that occurred in Srebrenica constitute the largest genocide in Europe since the Holocaust and symbolize a failure of intelligence collection during peacekeeping operations, thereby undermining the credibility of western governments and the UN.
Second, Srebrenica occurred on the heels of the Rwandan genocide a year earlier, and thus the discussion at the UN, concerning Srebrenica, arose in an environment where the UN P5 and the international community more generally, were all coming to terms with the consequences of their inaction in Rwanda.
Third, in recent years, there has been a turn towards formal recognition of Srebrenica as a genocide by the UN, providing an interesting opportunity to consider the historical context of the use of the term genocide by the P5 over time.
Through an analysis of diplomatic language utilized by UN P5 nations concerning how and whether to label Srebrenica a genocide, RINGROSE explores the intersections of language, power, and politics.
To do so, this article first considers the significance of an attention to language and its use by P5 members in particular, before introducing the specific case of Srebrenica while focusing on the history and context of the use—or avoidance—of the term ‘genocide’. After establishing this context, the article turns to an examination of the language used by P5 members in debates concerning Srebrenica.
This language is analyzed through the lens of framing theory, an approach adopted from its common use in mass-media communications theory to serve as a method of analyzing how particular nations frame and represent narratives around the genocide label.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. The first part involves an exploration of the explicit use of the term ‘genocide’ by P5 nations. The second part then considers situations where P5 nations employ euphemisms to avoid using the term.
“Together, an analysis of these discourses demonstrates how UN Security Council P5 members use language as a mechanism to frame a conflict in a particular way that aligns with their own national political interests,” the author states.
Through this analysis, the article reaffirms the importance of explicit semantic genocide recognition, not only as an important legal determination, but one that also affects acknowledgment of the significance of a given atrocity event, and post-conflict growth and mediation processes.
“The discourse analysis of 32 UN Security Council debates related to the Srebrenica genocide between 1995 and 2015 discussed in the article demonstrates how the P5 nations selectively framed this event according to each nation’s own beliefs and strategic interests,” RINGROSE states.
Moreover, the politicization of the rhetoric used in referring to the Srebrenica genocide appears to also have varied according to domestic policy considerations, Security Council power politics, and the complexities of language use within an international arena, wherein multiple actors are involved over time, she adds.
Future studies of language use within Security Council debates should focus on other acts of genocide in order to ascertain if the trends identified in this article are replicated. An analysis of language used in other documents relevant to the Srebrenica genocide, such as International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or International Court of Justice decisions, would also provide a helpful dataset.
While some may argue the use of language within the UN Security Council is mere incidental semantic variation, the continued avoidance of the genocide label within the Security Council in relation to the Srebrenica genocide supports the thesis that the P5 nations use language as a mechanism to frame a conflict in a particular manner that aligns with their own political interests, the author states.
“As such, this article reaffirms the importance of genocide recognition as more than a legal issue. Rather, such recognition, or lack thereof, in various fora, including the official statements of the P5 Security Council nations, has the ability to increase or decrease communal violence and revenge, and to either help alleviate or perpetuate, transgenerational cultural trauma associated with denial.”

Ringrose, Michelle E. (2020) ‘The Politicization of the Genocide Label: Genocide Rhetoric in the UN Security Council,’ Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 14: Iss. 1: 124-142.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1603

Successes and Failures of UN Peace Operations

What does ‘success’ in peace operations mean? Is it purely the absence of hostilities, or should it also be measured in terms of civilian suffering? Did a United Nations peacekeeping mission succeed because it fulfilled its mandate of monitoring elections or did it fail because it was not able to prevent civilian massacres in the areas where peacekeepers were deployed?
Writing in Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History, D.B. PUSHKINA examines the existing measures of the UN’s effectiveness, proposes a new scale of measurement of successes and failures of UN peacekeeping operations and examines six cases in Africa (UNTAG in Namibia, ONOMOZ in Mozambique, UNAMIR in Rwanda, UNOSOM in Somalia, MINURCA in the Central African Republic, ONUB in Burundi) across proposed measures.
The definition of success the author offers in the article – ‘Successes and Failures of United Nations Peace Operations’ – comprises limiting violent conflict, reducing human suffering, preventing conflict from spreading, and preventing war from recurring.
That definition, according to the author, does two important things: 1) it acknowledges the different nuances, voices, and forces – international and domestic, societal and institutional – affecting whether a mission may or may not be considered successful; 2) it insists that the human dimension remains the primary criterion for such considerations.
“A more nuanced consideration of ‘success’ and a close look at so many cases is relevant not only to conceptual debates about these issues but also to ‘real’ policy in the past, present, and future.”
The six UN peacekeeping missions in Africa originated after the end of the Cold war and have been completed at the time of writing. She finds that two out of those missions succeeded across most of the criteria, two failed and two fell into the gray area of partial success-partial failure.
“The most important observation that can be made from this classification is that in several cases the overall assessment does not overlap with mandate implementation,” the author states. For example, ONUB in Burundi, despite fulfilling most of the mandate’s objectives and classified by the UN as one of its most successful missions is placed in the partial success/failure group, mostly due to the current instability in Burundi, hence, UN’s weaker contribution in progress towards positive peace.
Concerning various criteria of success, UN peacekeeping has been particularly unsuccessful in preventing genocide and/or civilian massacres. Varying success was demonstrated in limiting violence, preventing violent deaths and refugee and IDP resettlement/preventing outflows. UN missions have been fairly successful in preventing conflicts from spreading and creating regional instability.
Regarding conflict resolution measures, UN missions performed better in preventing reoccurrence of war within two years after departure, but UN peacekeeping has been less successful at contributing to progress towards positive peace.
The difference between evaluation of the missions based solely on mandate implementation versus on their contribution to limiting violence, reducing human suffering, preventing conflict spread, preventing the recurrence of war and contributing to progress toward positive peace leads to a deeper understanding of whether the UN Security Council is making the right decisions for particular situations and whether UN peace operations are indeed utilizing all of their potential for bringing stability to the world.
Successful missions offer support for an optimistic outlook. Partial successes, especially those of missions deployed amid ongoing wars, reinforce this optimism but offer a word of caution to avoid too demanding expectations of UN troops. “Finally, failed missions should never be forgotten or under-analyzed in order not only to avoid mistakes in the future but also not to place all blame on peacekeepers as opposed to the decision-making bodies.”

Pushkina D. B. Successes and Failures of United Nations Peace Operations. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History, 2020, vol. 65, Iss. 1, рр. 261–277.
https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2020.115