Power and Diplomacy in the UN Security Council: The Influence of Elected Members

There is well-known claim that due to the dominant position of the veto-wielding five permanent (P5) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the ten members elected to two-year terms (E10) are left with little space to be influential in that body. 
However, VAHID NICK PAY AND PRZEMYSŁAW POSTOLSKI argue that, in fact, there could be powerful channels for the E10 to exercise significant influence.
Writing in The International Spectator, the authors present the cases of Poland’s 2018-2019 and South Africa’s 2019-2020 terms as elected members UNSC to challenge the claim that due to a prevailing democratic, legitimacy or efficiency deficit(s) in the structure and/or working methods of the Council, there is no significant space for the E10 members to be influential.
“By examining these two representative cases, the E10’s capacity to exert such influence can indeed be detected on multiple levels, which highlights the numerous channels and practices available to the elected members to act as veritable norm entrepreneurs at this most prominent institution of global governance,” they write in the research article ‘Power and Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council: The Influence of Elected Members’.
Regarding the dynamics of legitimacy, these case studies demonstrate that the position of elected members can be strengthened by building various coalitions with other members to extend their ability to influence the Council’s decision-making. In the cases of Poland and South Africa, the coalitions built with P5 and other E10 members paved the way for important accomplishments, such as the adoption of resolutions 2475 and 2493.
As far as diplomatic capacities are concerned, the example of South Africa appears to provide an interesting alternative for arrangements of resources for medium and small powers through keeping a considerable number of decision-making functions back in the capital, PAY and POSTOLSKI state. 
“Despite obvious procedural challenges, this seems to have provided significant advantages such as reduced costs, resource-sharing with other government sectors and, most importantly, opportunities for involving a broader number of actors, in particular the civil society.” Such potential for change in the working methods may contribute to strengthening the overall position of the E10 in the Council.
The study has also confirmed that even though the agency of an elected member, primarily manifested through its effectively deployed resources and diplomatic capacities, is important in determining its influence in the Council, no less important are conditions extending beyond the Council member’s direct control, the authors note. 
“In this light, Poland’s and South African’s voices were at times significantly amplified by the presence of other supportive members in the Council and other favorable conditions.”
In the case of South Africa, its concomitant presidency of the Council and of the African Union and numerous proactive diplomatic initiatives combined with unexpected support from other E10 members acted as enabling factors to simultaneously promote geopolitical questions of national interest and build and strengthen consensus in the Council. 
Therefore, when serving in the Council, one must factor in such elements as timing, political context and the composition of the Council in a given term. All these conditions can be either favorable or detrimental to the overall performance of an elected member.
Furthermore, the authors stress, the E10’s influence can be exercised through formal and informal mechanisms in the Council’s decision-making. In this vein, both cases clearly demonstrate that UNSC presidencies, Arria-formula meetings and high-level political engagement were especially useful, as highlighted for the aforementioned resolutions 2493 and 2475.
To be sure, the resolutions tabled by Poland and South Africa were hardly controversial as these were themes that most countries could agree upon. It must be borne in mind, however, that due to the political polarization of the Council highlighted above, even the P5 are increasingly incapable of reaching a consensus on difficult questions, as evidenced by the official Council data on the number of consensus resolutions. “This, in turn, could open up significant perspectives for influence for the elected members.”
Taking everything into account, it becomes evident that, despite the prevailing position of the P5, the elected members can play an important and sometimes even crucial role in the Council’s decision-making. 
One interesting conclusion from the above cases could be an appreciation of the fact that the E10’s capacity for playing such a fundamental role in the Council has been underpinned by their less pronounced national and geopolitical interests at the Council compared to the P5. 
This undoubtedly puts the E10 in a more flexible negotiating position, capable of going beyond ‘red lines’ and even acting as power brokers in the Council. This important attribute, which could be regarded as a foundational element of multilateralism, might be even more sorely needed in an increasingly polarized Council faced with the realities of a systemic shift towards a multipolar world. 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the presence of the E10 in the Council not only underpins its dynamics of legitimacy but also safeguards its very foundations of multilateralism, reposing on elements of devolution of power, pooling of sovereignty and compromise. 
In addition, the emerging trends towards the reform of the Council’s working methods and the inclusion of wider global actors and the civil society in debates have the potential to turn the E10 into veritable norm entrepreneurs of the Council’s developing working methods that could lead to future structural reforms. 
“Such drives to informal reforms appear to be even more crucial as the debates over the nature, the viability or even the desirability of structural reforms of the Council proves to be far from over for the foreseeable future.” 

Vahid Nick Pay and Przemysław Postolski (2021) Power and Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council: The Influence of Elected Members, The International Spectator, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2021.1966192