Reaching Internally Displaced Persons to Achieve the 2030 Agenda

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The specific needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those stuck in situations of protracted displacement, require states, the United Nations and other humanitarian and development actors to address longer-term challenges and conceptualize, develop, and implement policies that will provide sustainable solutions for these vulnerable populations.
“Addressing both the immediate and the longer term needs of IDPs may require challenging existing practices and mindsets,” according to a new issue brief by the International Peace Institute. Humanitarian actors, traditionally focused on immediate emergency needs, must address protracted displacement. States with high levels of internal displacement must address the needs of IDPs in their implementation of the 2030 Agenda, write ALICE DEBARRE, ARCHIBALD HENRY and MASOOMA RAHMATY.
The international community also has an important role to play in supporting states in this endeavor. For humanitarian and development actors in particular, strategic coordination of efforts, and, where feasible, joint planning and cooperation, will be key.
The authors state that the following recommendations will help ensure that states, the UN, and other humanitarian and development actors are adequately addressing the long-term needs of IDPs:
• Member states should turn their commitment to “leave no one behind” into policy and programming by including IDPs’ concerns in their development planning. In their efforts to ensure that they are on track to implement the 2030 Agenda, states should address internal displacement in their development plans. They should also include information on IDPs in their voluntary national reviews. Ensuring that IDPs’ concerns are being considered will also require that they be included in development budgets at the local, regional, and national levels. Inter-ministerial cooperation will be essential for all of this.
• Humanitarian and development actors should systematically remind national governments of their obligations vis-à-vis IDPs. The core responsibility of supporting IDPs lies with affected states, but humanitarian and development actors can encourage and support member states to implement the 2030 Agenda in ways that include the unique needs of displaced populations.
• The UN and other humanitarian and development actors should strive for closer coordination and cooperation when addressing the needs of IDPs and finding sustainable solutions, particularly in situations of protracted displacement. Existing efforts, such as those highlighted in this issue brief, should be strengthened and streamlined.
• In designing and implementing IDP-inclusive development policies, all stakeholders should ensure that data informing these policies is reliable and takes into account the voices of those affected. For development policies and programs to be tailored to the situation they aim to address, including its gender dimensions, they need to be built on solid data, recognition of the population’s needs, and an understanding of how those needs can best be addressed.

The UN and Atrocity Crimes: The Over-Politicization of Decision-Making in the Security Council

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There is much evidence of the omnipresent over-politicization of issues in the United Nations Security Council, writes MARTIN DAVENAS in a working paper published by University College London’s Global Governance Institute.
“First, one negative vote from any permanent member, the national interests of which are fully ‘globalized’, can paralyze the whole organization and therefore let mass violations of human rights continue unhindered.”
Secondly, he states, the authority of the UN is undermined by those states that were initially considered collectively responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as those states that resist collective responses to atrocity crimes because they accuse the organization of being partial. Furthermore, balancing the need for sanctioning or intervening in states for the enforcement of peace in the long term, and the present protection of the concerned population's human rights, are a controversial and political issue in the Security Council, which ultimately generates distrust for the organization, hence the legitimacy deficit affecting the UN.
Finally, the UN’s credibility is greatly affected by its past failures, including situations where interventions have had direct detrimental effects on human rights as well as those where UN mandates have been manipulated for the attainment of national political and/or economic advantages. This further contributes to the ‘delegitimization’ of the UN, since legitimacy is nothing but the belief that the institution must be obeyed.
The UN was, from the beginning, susceptible to over-politicization, fueled by institutionalized inequalities. Compliance with or resistance of UN institutions are used as an instrument of political posturing on the international stage. “Consequently, one could consider that the UN, a most ambitious idea, may have been too modern at the time of the drafting of the Charter, in the sense that states clung to a traditional approach to international politics and diplomacy, which was not compatible with the collective acknowledgement that international cooperation was vital in order to uphold human rights and humanitarian law,” DAVENAS writes. “In the end, it appears that the disagreements between the powerful states were too great for them to carry the collective responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.”
The UN was envisioned to be a forum where states could coordinate their efforts to tackle international problems, and it has created a body of international law to promote economic and social development and advance international peace and security. From the codification of international law, to the judicial settlement of disputes and the quest for accountability, the UN could be considered the embryo of a real supranational organization with authority over its members, but it is still tainted by the political views and ambitions of its most prominent members.
The systematic over-politicization of issues in the Security Council discredits the organization and its legitimacy. Logically, an international organization supposedly representing the whole international community should only act in the interests of that community. In order to do so, the UN needs to be more detached and independent from individual concerns of state actors, which necessarily implies that ‘Great Powers’ must relinquish at least some of their privileges, so that the UN can fulfil its function of ‘center for harmonizing the actions of nations’.
While there is a certain consensus on the necessity to reform the Security Council, there are disagreements on the changes that need to be made. The most frequent propositions are the addition of both permanent and non-permanent members for the sake of representativity as well as changing the Security Council’s working methods, notably restriction of the use of the veto. For instance, the ‘G4’, namely Brazil, India, Japan and Germany, have been bidding to obtain a permanent seat at the Security Council. It is true that these states' economic growth and political influence give them a good claim on any future permanent seat in the Security Council, but in the framework of an organ dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security, it is doubtful that economic might is a relevant criterion. It would also be difficult to extend permanent membership because there will always be opposition from rival bidders or influential neighboring states. If the Security Council is to be extended, the principle of fair regional distribution has to be respected.
As a response to the G4 request, the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ movement advocated for maintaining five permanent members but having twenty elected members. There would be six African states, five Asian states, four Latin American and Caribbean States, three from Western Europe and Other States and two from Eastern Europe. Marcello Spatafora, former Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, said in 2005, while discussing the United for Consensus proposition, that the credibility of the organization and its process of reform was at stake, and that these reforms could not be dictated by power or money, but had to be dictated by principles. The consequences of veto use so far suggests that there should not be more states able to wield that power, as it will likely hinder the work of the Security Council even more.
In the context of atrocity crimes and mass violations of human rights, DAVENAS stresses, there is a need to separate the discussion from political concerns: the question of how to prevent or put an end to gross violations of basic human rights is about morals, not about politics. “If states cannot be trusted to forego national interests or political advantages even in such terrible contexts, then the veto power should not be given to new states, and its use should be restricted for those that already have it.”
This sort of proposal has already been made: for instance, the S5, a group of five states, namely Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, suggested in 2005 that permanent members should, upon casting a veto, provide ‘an explanation for [their] decision that is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and relevant international law’, and further called on the P5 to ‘refrain from using the veto 'to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crime and crimes against humanity’. Unsurprisingly, this proposal encountered strong opposition from some permanent members.
Since the Syrian conflict, however, various proposals have been made, aimed at improving the work of the Security Council in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. For instance, the French and Mexican initiative of 2015 advocates for the suspension of veto powers in situations of mass atrocities. The proposal gives responsibility to the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Council ‘situations involving, or likely leading to, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes’. Truly, if permanent members could be persuaded to relinquish this power in cases of atrocities, it would constitute a major improvement as the Council could not be a bystander to these atrocities.
The Secretary-General, as an independent actor in the UN, could raise the matter ‘automatically’ as soon as alarming reports appear, and when UN experts would reach the certitude that such crimes may take place, the veto power would be suspended. This sort of reform is not entirely far-fetched, in the sense that already France and the United Kingdom have not used the veto since 1989. Further, in September 2015, then-French President François Hollande pledged, at the UNGA, that ‘France will never use its power of veto where there have been mass atrocities’, and the United Kingdom also has reiterated that it would not use its veto to block credible action aimed at stopping mass atrocities.
Still, without real determination from other permanent members, these proposals will have to be negotiated, and compromises found between the ‘Big Five’, since the United States, Russia and China would only accept to give up this power in return for insurances or compensations, which might end up undermining the reach of these reforms.
Nevertheless, DAVENAS concludes, it is an encouraging thought that some states are willing to freely relinquish their special powers and thus shift priorities in order to focus on attaining international peace and security and respect for human rights.

Humanitarian Action and Foreign Policy: Balancing Interests and Values

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Using a foreign policy lens to understand how states engage in humanitarian action, and juggle competing interests, values and priorities, is a powerful way to consider both DAC and non-DAC donors against a common framework – as well as offering suggestions on how best to engage them in advocating for more effective humanitarian action, a new report by the Overseas Development Institute stresses.
In their study titled ‘Humanitarian action and foreign policy: Balancing interests and values’, BARNABY WILLITTS-KING, SHERINE EL TARABOULSI-MCCARTHY and JOHN BRYANT explore how the humanitarian action undertaken by different states interacts with their foreign policy in a period of geopolitical turbulence. They show that state humanitarian action is constantly evolving in an elaborate relationship with other foreign policy priorities.
“There are multiple examples of where these other interests take the focus away from humanitarian priorities, such as when national security and trade opportunities dominate,” they write. “But to argue for the depoliticization of aid is both unrealistic and misses the opportunity to harness the power of states – both DAC and non-DAC – for better humanitarian outcomes by engaging with them differently.”
Humanitarian action is inescapably part of foreign policy, and needs to be considered in that light, the report stresses. Aid can be at once humanitarian and in the national interest, despite this being uncomfortable territory for humanitarians. These two goals need not be intrinsically opposed – but also where they are in conflict – need to be better defined and explained.
The authors make the following recommendations to states, donors and humanitarian agencies:

Understand the politics
Applying a foreign policy lens can help in better understanding how countries can engage effectively beyond donorship. The politics of aid is a reality. Understanding the bureaucratic and political drivers of donor decision-making is therefore key to engaging constructively and effectively with that process. In the current climate of realist approaches to foreign policy, this means engaging with the language of ‘aid in the national interest’ and finding ways to express and promote principled and values-based approaches in those terms – but without being co-opted or compromising these values. Where necessary, realist narratives should be countered with arguments based on values.
Humanitarian actors must recognize that bureaucracies are complex and not as monolithic as they may appear and should give greater priority to finding champions and opportunities to influence people and processes. Engaging directly with diplomats for example – whether in the field or at headquarters – rather than just aid officials, offers scope to understand and influence the wider context within which states engage in crises.
Building stronger bridges between the diplomatic and humanitarian parts of governments to forge a pragmatic partnership based on more mutual understanding of motivations and drivers is critical. Rather than seeing diplomats as the ‘dark side’ of government, their role in managing multiple interests means that they need to be engaged if humanitarians are to better communicate the reasons for a humanitarian focus. Keeping an open mind towards the opportunities of a more politically informed, constructive engagement with foreign policymaking should strengthen rather than undermine humanitarian priorities.

Recognize diversity in donorship
In advocacy terms, there is a role for civil society – primarily domestic NGOs – to push their governments to clarify how they balance competing interests, why decisions appear to go against stated humanitarian policy, or where different policies are incompatible.
Civil society space is essential to ensuring a critical voice. Donors must continue to support independent civil society, both at crisis level, through support to locally led responses, and internationally.
Recognizing that all governments, whether DAC or non-DAC make (usually rational) choices between different priorities argues for a deeper understanding of what drives different states’ decisions, so that advocacy can be tailored to their specific frames of reference. This applies particularly to relationships between DAC and non-DAC donors. While being realistic about the limits of such partnerships, DAC/GHD donors should broaden their fora or find alternatives for discussing policy towards countries in crisis.
While DAC donors continue to provide the bulk of reported contributions to the ‘formal’ humanitarian system, comprising the UN, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs, there is increasing recognition of the role of non-DAC donors in funding or operating in different crises. Beyond simple caricature, their motivations are in reality just as complex and multifaceted as those of the DAC donors. There is a need to recognize the different advantages and disadvantages of different donors, whether through geography or relationships in particular crises, for example as a result of colonial history or shared religious affiliation. Different donors also prioritize different sectors or geographic areas for funding, for example Australia’s focus on the Asia-Pacific, or the Gulf States’ preference for the Arab world. Better appreciation of and transparency around diverse approaches is needed to do aggregate each state’s efforts, rather than assuming there is a single ideal donor model. Relationships are being strengthened between DAC and non-DAC donors, particularly at field/crisis level, but further efforts are needed to cultivate stronger institutional relationships based on shared interests and a more nuanced understanding of diverse approaches to humanitarian action. This could take the form of exchanges for institution building or joint research.

Strive for transparency
States need to be more explicit and transparent about their humanitarian commitments, and where these commitments collide or conflict with other objectives and policies, where they are de-prioritized, or where they align with the national interest. Models of crisis-level donor coordination according to comparative advantage should be documented and highlighted, for example in DAC peer reviews.

Revisit humanitarian principles across cultures
Central to building credible relationships between ‘rising’ and ‘established’ donors will be an appreciation of the different values underlying their responses – but also identifying where there is common ground. Principles can exclude, but they can also be made operationally meaningful.
Emerging platforms for non-Western civil society and foundations, such as the Arab Foundations Forum, can be galvanized to provide an opportunity for collaboration with international actors, and for investments in in-depth and sustained debate on aid policies around the world.

The United Nations and Middle Eastern Security

"The traditional approach of peacekeeping in the Middle East has now evolved into an approach that also seeks to work towards regional security by emphasizing human security," writes ALLISON MILLER. "This reframing has resulted in the UN supplying developmental and humanitarian aid in various ways.
"The UN recognizes that there needs to be unity across every ethnic and religious line to continue addressing the situation in the Middle East. The conflicts currently facing the Middle East have created the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War and this population of vulnerable people create a difficult challenge for neighboring countries attempting to aid them.
"The level of human suffering in the Middle East increases the concern over security in a multitude of ways, such as the exploitation of vulnerable populations or the lack of resources being provided to address basic health care and trauma. The UN needs the continuing support of the international community in order to continue their humanitarian and protective missions in the Middle East. Failing to garner the support of the international community could prove to be detrimental to the security of the Middle East in the coming years.
"The UN will need to remain in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. With the presence of ISIS winding down, the war in Yemen, increasing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and other regional issues the UN is able to fill the role of a moderating third party. The UN is also providing critical support to the people in areas that are subject to degrading and dehumanizing conditions every day. However, as an institution of global governance, the UN cannot continue operating at its current capacity in the Middle East without unwavering support of the international community. If anything, key actors that are involved with the Middle East should be doing more to support UN efforts, be it financially or by other means.
"As time progresses the UN should attempt to involve regional actors, such as the Arab League, more often in attempt to decrease their role in governance. The Arab League has been involved, but it appears as though this involvement has been limited. Given that the Arab League is a prominent regional organization in the Middle East, they need to be given a more active platform and presence with the UN. Doing so is necessary to both create and promote any possibilities for peace and stability."

Reforming the United Nations Security Council: An Assessment of the ‘Group of Four’ Proposal

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ADRIAN KANTILAL SHAH, considering the major proposals to reform the structure of the United Nations Security Council, concludes that the one put forward by the Group of Four (Japan, India, Brazil and Germany) is the most ideal. In addition to giving permanent seats to the aforementioned four countries, the proposal envisages two permanent seats for African states. Four additional nonpermanent seats would be created, one each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
While providing member states that have made substantial contributions in maintaining international peace and security an opportunity to continue doing so on a permanent basis, SHAH contends, the Group of Four proposal achieves the main goal of structural reform: making the Security Council more representative of today’s world.
In other words, apart from providing better representation to regions that have historically been underrepresented in the world’s top decision-making body, the proposal adds permanent seat holders. “This is important because it acts as a buffer to the power and control which is currently exercised by the Permanent Five Member States,” SHAH states. This element sets it apart from the Uniting for Consensus proposal, which focuses specifically on creating new non-permanent seats which, in effect, maintains the current 'class-system' within the Security Council.
While it can be argued that the Group of Four proposal, too, maintains the same ‘class-system’ by adding permanent members, SHAH writes, it must be viewed against its transformative potential through its recognition of Member-States that have grown economically as well as militarily as well as the need for better representation to regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America in a proportionate manner.
Of the other dimensions of reform, he states, the Security Council in recent years has made progress in re-assessing and amending its working methods, thereby working toward building greater accountability and transparency. The question of the veto is more complicated. Here, too, there is growing recognition that exercise of the veto should be restricted in order to permit the Security Council to carry out its work more effectively.

International Support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force: A Fragile Military Response

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The Sahel Joint Force (JF-G5S) initiative represents a broader tendency of seeking ‘African solutions to African problems’ on a continent where Western states are reluctant to deploy troops due to domestic political and budgetary constraints, writes SIGNE MARIE COLD-RAVNKILDE in a new policy brief for the Danish Institute for International Studies. However, the force is still far from operational, and it is questionable what the force can actually achieve given the circumstances on the ground.
"France has been the most active European member-state in the Sahel in terms of military engagement. Yet after four years of deploying 4,000 soldiers to its counterinsurgency operation, Barkhane, French resources are overstretched, and new partners are needed to complement their fight against terrorism in the Sahara," she writes.
"[T]apping into a broader discussion of the UN’s suitability in asymmetrical warfare, the direct counterinsurgency mandate of JF-G5S was a much-requested add-on to the UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane. Since the deployment of more than 13,000 of MINUSMA’s troops in 2013, of which about 35% originate from the G5 states, regional actors have expressed concerns that the UN has not done enough to counter terrorism. As jihadist violence has grown steadily in Mali’s cross-border regions outside the scope of MINUSMA’s mandate, the incentives of neighbouring states to engage in counterinsurgency operations have increased.
Teething problems risk becoming permanent financial, institutional and legitimacy deficits of the force, COLD-RAVNKILDE writes. "For the JF-G5S to become operational, its international partners must increase sustained financial and logistical support while ensuring that accountability mechanisms and human rights frameworks are adequately developed and implemented. However, even if operational, the JF-G5S alone cannot solve the root causes of long-standing security challenges deeply embedded in historical conflict dynamics and aggravated local grievances. This would require the G5 states and their partners prioritise human security and targeted development activities in remote and neglected cross-border regions."

Use of Force in Humanitarian Crises: Addressing the Limitations of UN Security Council Authorization

"While the use of force without explicit UN authorization may be perceived as pushing the limits of international law," PAUL R. WILLIAMS and SOPHIE PEARLMAN argue, "a framework helps to ensure that use of force will fit under R2P." The authors propose the following criteria:
(1) a prima facie case must be established that atrocity crimes are occurring or are about to occur;
(2) peaceful options have been exhausted;
(3) the Security Council is unable to act in a timely and appropriate manner;
(4) any military force used must be limited to low-intensity options designed to protect populations and must be carried out in such a way as to limit collateral damage;
(5) the use of low-intensity military force must be authorized by a legitimate authority, which could include the UN General Assembly, regional organizations, or international coalitions;
(6) the intervention must come at the request of credible opposition groups that represent victims of atrocity crimes and shall be done collectively by members of the
international community; and
(7) the use of force should be followed up with or integrated into a larger strategy and policy for addressing the humanitarian crisis.
"[Such a framework] would allow for interventions to protect civilians in situations where the Security Council is gridlocked but a rogue state is actively harming or plans to harm its people and would codify a customary international legal norm for humanitarian intervention. Moreover, this framework would provide opportunities for justifying the use of force along the lines of international law and for the U.S. to cite international law as a legal justification for its actions."