United Nations Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice

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Although numerous studies exist on how best to use sanctions and on how best to mediate conflicts, relatively little is known about when and whether these tools work well or work poorly together.
THOMAS BIERSTEKER, REBECCA BRUBAKER, and DAVID LANZ have taken the first step in what they describe as a long overdue effort to establish evidence that can be used to inform practice in the joint application of UN sanctions and mediation.
Their report, UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice, is based on an 18-month policy research project conducted by the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and swisspeace.
UN sanctions can complement mediation efforts in a number of ways, the authors write. “For example, a threat of UN sanctions can help bring parties to the table, just as the prospect of de-listing can entice a sanctioned actor to participate in peace talks.”
Similarly, a threat or enhanced enforcement of UN sanctions can make the status quo of unsettled conflict less attractive and can help encourage an individual or group to sign an agreement. Once an agreement is signed, sectoral and individual targeted sanctions can help deter actions aimed at undermining the agreement. Additionally, the creation of a new, or the adaptation of an existing, UN sanctions regime can promote compliance with a peace agreement. Conversely, the promise of UN sanctions suspension or lifting can help make settlements more attractive.
At the same time, the authors state, UN sanctions can also complicate mediation efforts in a number of ways. “For example, the stigmatizing effect of sanctions can, in some instances, lead to the exclusion of a targeted party from a peace process. In parallel, placing some parties under sanctions and not others, can embolden non-sanctioned actors who may then be more likely to pursue a military rather than negotiated settlement of the conflict.”
Moreover, decisions to sanction one party, or all but one party, can affect the perception of the UN’s impartiality and can jeopardize the mediator’s relationship with the conflict parties and their continued acceptance of mediation.
Threats of UN sanctions have been used to force premature agreements, which can backfire, as agreements reached without the genuine consent and ownership of the parties are unlikely to last. Using sanctions without leaving room for their removal can prematurely close the space for mediation. When sanctions are applied out of sync with mediation’s processes and goals, the measures can create conflicting signals for sanctions targets and can put the mediation process at risk.
Mediation needs sometimes influence the design or redesign of UN sanctions regimes, BIERSTEKER, BRUBAKER, and LANZ write. “For example, blockages in a mediation process can lead to threats of sanctions being issued or to the creation of a new sanctions regime. The need to advance a process can lead to both listings and de-listings.”
In addition, the need to ensure the participation of key actors in peace talks often leads to requests for travel ban exemptions or to the toleration of travel ban violations. Lastly, in the interest of furthering mediation efforts, entire new sanctions regimes have been created and existing regimes have been split, reduced, or expanded.
The report concludes with twenty policy recommendations intended for the UN Security Council, UN sanctions committees, UN Secretariat, and senior UN mediators. The recommendations are focused on promoting complementarity and avoiding complication between UN sanctions and mediation. It also proffers five areas for further research.

Thomas Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker, and David Lanz, “UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice”, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 18 February 2019.