LOUISE RIIS ANDERSEN, in assessing how and by whom liberal internationalism may be sustained in the coming order, provides a critical and historically grounded analysis of the role of the United Nations in the fading US-led order and the ordering potential and role of middle powers.
Writing in International Journal, she suggests that in the current interregnum of global governance the conventional distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers is increasingly unhelpful. “What matters is not their past history but their present proclivity for seeking multilateral, negotiated solutions.” It is this pragmatic version of liberal internationalism that may have a future in a post-Western world, and open up a more pluralist, inclusive approach to global governance.
“The world order is in flux. That much we know. The shape of things to come, however, remains anybody’s guess,” ANDERSEN states in her essay titled ‘Curb your enthusiasm: Middle-power liberal internationalism and the future of the United Nations’. The emerging order could be multipolar or bipolar or end up taking on new and unforeseen forms of multi-order, multiplex, networked arrangements that defy easy categorization.
Debating the future of the UN is interesting in its own right, the author states. “Here it provides a prism for understanding the crisis of liberal internationalism, including the suggestion that the crisis has been brought upon liberals themselves through their own post-Cold War triumphalism.” The problem is not as much liberal excess as it is liberal amnesia: liberal internationalists have forgotten the pragmatic, even realist, roots of the rules-based world order that has the UN at its center.
If liberal internationalism is to be sustained in the coming order, it must be in a revised form that brings out and revitalizes pragmatism and the will to compromise as a key element in international affairs. Such a revision – if it is to come – is most likely to emerge from middle powers who have the strength and authority to act independently of the great powers, yet whose limited capabilities and inability to dictate outcomes or decisions make them prone to favor negotiated solutions over the use of force.
Noting that the crisis of the current order is mostly debated on US terms, ANDERSEN states that emphasis is placed on questions related to hegemonic decline, imperial overreach, and the rise of rivalling global powers (notably China). While one cannot and should not underestimate the role played by the US in firstly establishing and now undermining the post-1945 institutional order, a broader and more nuanced perspective is needed if we are to, firstly, understand the dynamics that have brought the existing order into its current crisis, and, secondly, contemplate in which forms – and by whom – elements of liberal internationalism might be sustained in a future order.
Turning to the middle powers, she states that the debate is conventionally shaped by a distinction between traditional, Western middle powers – widely conceptualized as stabilizers and legitimizers of the existing US-led order – and emerging, Global South middle powers more prone to revisionist and counter-hegemonic behavior. This distinction is increasingly unhelpful. When the hegemon itself is determined to destroy the institutional order established under its reign, ‘traditional’ middle-power liberal internationalism becomes counterhegemonic, while the revisions suggested by emerging powers emerge as stabilizing.
The essay looks, firstly, to the past to revisit the constitutional process that spurred the establishment of the UN in 1945 as an inherently paradoxical and limited instrument. Secondly, it looks to the present to outline the troubled position held by the UN within the US-led world order, and how this relates to the current crisis of liberal order. Finally, in conclusion, it looks to the future to identify how a revised, pragmatic middle-power liberal internationalism centered around the UN may help stabilize the current interregnum.
“The fluidity of both the players and the plot is part of what makes the interregnum of global governance so difficult to grasp,” ANDERSEN states. Revisiting and restoring a more statist, pragmatic version of liberal internationalism may, however, help bring back some of the predictability and stability that middle powers tend to favor.
Emphasizing negotiated rather than imposed solutions, and the importance of dialogue and compromise in politics and diplomacy, opens a space for a more pluralist and inclusive approach to global governance and international rulemaking. “While this will not sustain the liberal order of the post-Cold War era, it will surely be necessary to stabilize the transition from a US-led order to a post-Western world.”
Andersen, L. R. (2019). Curb your enthusiasm: Middle-power liberal internationalism and the future of the United Nations. International Journal, 74(1), 47–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019833739
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