Why Do States So Avidly Seek a Nonpermanent Seat On the United Nations Security Council?

Why do states seek a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council? The obvious answer is that the UN Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Despite their formal power, ANN-MARIE EKENGREN, FREDRIK D. HJORTHEN and ULRIKA MÖLLER remind us, there are important limitations to the influence Council members are able to wield. For one, the capacity of the Council to exercise its authority is highly contingent on the voluntary cooperation of states, which in turn depends on the perceived legitimacy of the Council.
Moreover, a number of circumstances contribute to monopolizing effective decision-making power with the Permanent Five (P5), reducing the role of the Elected Ten (E10) to considering “previously cooked decisions.” In addition to the veto, the P5 has access to the institutional memory of the Council, has more experienced diplomatic staff, and has competence in practices such as ‘penholding’.
Yet this does not appear to have curbed the enthusiasm of other UN members for seeking an elected seat. Instead, there has been an increase in competition, leading to more intensive and elaborate election campaigns. The competitive challenge facing aspiring members is compounded by the increase in UN membership, from 104 in 1963 to 193 in 2018.
Member States seeking an elected seat are now up against more competitors and need to win the support of more countries to secure the required number of votes. Accordingly, securing a nonpermanent seat has been described as “more of a prize than ever”. It might seem, therefore, that the gains of an elected seat outweigh the costs of competing for it. But what exactly do aspiring members hope to achieve?
Departing from the overarching assumption that power and influence is at stake, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER investigate what states think they will achieve by serving on the Council. Their article, ‘A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council: Why Bother?’, published in the journal Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, contributes with a novel systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of why states find a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council attractive.
Three conceptualizations of power—to influence, to network, and to gain status—guide the empirical analysis. A telephone interview survey with diplomatic staff at Member States’ permanent missions to the United Nations in New York provides readers with original and unique empirical knowledge of state perceptions of power.
The candidature for a seat comes with expectations of influencing decision-making, despite modest estimations of the opportunity to have impact, the authors state. Opportunities to network and to gain status are not frequent reasons for a candidature. Diplomats’ estimations are nevertheless higher on the opportunity to actually establish relevant relationships and to gain status brought by a seat.
The most interesting findings of the study are reached by comparing: (1) stated reasons for wanting a seat with estimations of the power-enhancing benefits brought by a seat; and (2) reasons ascribed to other states for wanting a seat with the stated reasons for one’s own state. When diplomats were asked why a seat was of interest, they rated the opportunity to influence the agenda as the main reason. When asked about the benefits of holding an elected seat, they were modest in their ratings of this type of influence. Conversely, they were optimistic in their assessment on the opportunity to establish networks, but this was not among the most important stated reasons for wanting a seat.
The pattern for status was similar, although the difference was not as accentuated; status was not a main reason for wanting a seat, but expectations that an elected seat brings status were rather high.
It might seem puzzling that a main reason for wanting a seat was to influence the agenda when assessments of the opportunity to do so were so modest, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER state. However, this indicates awareness of the actual obstacles facing the elected members and that influence is still greater with than without a seat. Moreover, it may be that improved relations and status are seen by states as (direct or indirect) forms of influence too, making the discrepancy between influence as a reason for seeking a seat and the reported lack of influence on Security Council decision-making less of a puzzle.
Regarding the expectation of stronger relationships with other actors, the results indicate that this was a by-product of the seat and not the main reason for seeking a seat in the first place. The expectation of improved status should be considered in light of the view expressed by many states that any increase in status is temporary and perhaps also limited to UN circles in New York. Hence, the conceptualization of power-enhancing benefits through networking and social interaction helps us understand states’ expectations once the seat is won.
The sense of obligation and ambition to take responsibility for the multilateral order expressed by many diplomats can be interpreted as a will to pursue and promote specific values and norms through the seat, the authors state. By contrast, when diplomats were asked about other states’ reasons for wanting a seat, their will to influence was to a much lesser degree paired with the wish to contribute to the multilateral order, and the aspirations for status were stated as much more important.
The difference in responses regarding their own and other states can mean several things. For one, it could be that, when asked about other states, respondents were more honest and that the interest in status in fact applied to their own state as well. On the other hand, it could be that states generalize based on the existence of a few well-known examples of status seekers. Moreover, the tendency to attach less weight to the wish to influence for promoting values and norms and more weight on status seeking of other states might be interpreted as if states perceive a competition over status in these international settings that they do not want to admit.
Some states might also connect status seeking with small-state behavior and this might be easier to admit for other states than for their own. In addition, some states might want a seat to preserve a certain status and to remain relevant in global politics, while others seek a seat to improve their status and become more relevant.
Seeing status as a power-enhancing benefit paved the way for an intriguing finding in terms of the discrepancy between stated reasons for one’s own state and other states, according to the authors. It points to the relevance of the ongoing move within the literature toward incorporating a social dimension to the understanding of power and influence. The tendency to ascribe collective goals for seeking influence to one’s own state, but not to other states, is another finding that points to the remaining relevance on the debate between international relations theories on self-interested and collective purposes for action as well as with regard to the importance of values and norms in world politics.
“All three conceptualizations of power-enhancing benefits have proved useful in our analysis, albeit to a varying extent and in different ways,” the authors contend. For example, the prevalence on influence as a reason for seeking a seat in the Security Council may be seen to reflect the conceptualization of power that leans toward a material understanding of power consistent with neorealism. On the other hand, the reported emphasis on values and reform seems more in line with the neoliberal view. Finally, the reported presence and relevance of status considerations might be said to reflect more of a social understanding of power in line with the constructivist view.
Although previous studies on the candidatures and election of members to the Security Council have only briefly addressed the question of why states seek an elected seat, the authors state, there are no empirical studies focusing specifically on this topic. “Our article addresses this gap by focusing on the expectations that states have on an elected seat in the Council.”
Even with the modest response rate taken into account, it gives a substantial contribution to our understanding of why states run for a seat. “We believe this article opens the way for important future research on states’ reasons for international cooperation and interaction, in relation to a seat in the Council as well as in relation to other forms of international representation.”
Looking ahead, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER state, it would be relevant to investigate how states with different characteristics relate to the three different power-enhancing benefits and by doing so control for some possibly important background variables: Do middle-range powers have greater expectations (than smaller states) on the opportunity to influence the agenda in different institutional settings? Do states with a lower level of international integration have greater expectations regarding the opportunity for social interactions? Do smaller states have greater expectations of status through an elected seat in the Council, or in other international organizations?
In addition, structured case comparisons would be beneficial for the purpose of analyzing whether and how the campaigns for international representation reflect the described expectations. Do states with high expectations on influence, networking, or status invest more time and money in the campaigns? And are the campaigns designed differently depending on what states hope to achieve through a seat?

Ekengren, A., Hjorthen, F. D., & Möller, U. (2020). A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 26(1), 21-45. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02601007

A Review of the Academic Debate on Reforming the United Nations Security Council

Although member states have debated reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the organization’s inception, little attention has been paid to a full review outlining the academic debate, while exploring its underlying modes of thinking.
Writing in the Chinese Journal of Global Governance, BJARKE ZINCK WINTHER describes the academic debate’s historical backdrop and examines more recent contributions to the topic, thereby illustrating that research in support of structural reform of the UNSC has gradually moved from being the prevailing emphasis toward taking up a smaller share of the dialogue.
“Consequently, a discrepancy exists between the debates among UN member states, where calls for structural reform make up the majority, and the academic literature covering the topic,’ he writes in the research article ‘A Review of the Academic Debate about United Nations Security Council Reform’. “Subsequently, more research is needed to help explain this inclination.”
WINTHER maintains that his article does not propose that scholars are obliged to direct their research to fit with the interests of nation states. “However, research that covers an issue which significantly impacts global security must be attentive to the preferences of nation states.”
The arena of UN studies, expanding many fields, is closely tied to the diplomatic arena within the UN. “For this reason, scholars should be careful not to drive a wedge between the production of knowledge in academia and the application of knowledge in diplomatic circles.” This is particularly important if academics want to maintain the possibility of influencing global governance and policy creation, he adds.
“I propose that the task for UNSC reform research going forward is to explore new approaches so that the academic debate avoids becoming as gridlocked as the one among UN member states.”
WINTHER examines four types of UNSC-reform advocacy: ‘tenacious’ and ‘moderate’ advocacy each of structural reforms and working methods reforms. The answers found in both types of arguments for structural reform are constructed as normative propositions, arguing first and foremost, that principles of democracy and equality should be the central guides for how the international community approaches UNSC reform.
On the other side of the main dividing line, arguments in favor of working methods are based more on pragmatic considerations. Working methods proponents argue that the council was created to serve a function, and how that task is best fulfilled ought to be the primary guide for those discussing UNSC reform. “In short, structural reform arguments are based on calls for the council’s alignment with contemporary geopolitical realities, whereas working methods reform arguments are based on precautions against this.”
The central points from the four types of advocacy, however, are present in most if not all literature concerned with UNSC reform, the author states. That is, whether or not the structure of the UNSC aligns, or should align, with principals of equity and with the geopolitical realities of today.
Despite all the debates and rounds of negotiations in the UN, all the research, and suggestions on reform from academia, the issue remains unresolved. The proposed notion of convergence between the two lines of thinking found in academia is meant as an inspiration for the investigation of new approaches.
“Edward C. Luck was surely right,” WINTHER contends, “when he wrote that the proponents of structural reform need to do better in explaining how an expanded council would perform better, and those opposing structural reform in answering if no structural reform now, then when would the time be ripe?”
Therefore, research is needed that aligns the widespread quest for structural reform among member states with the critical observations from academia about the need to pay attention to how reform will impact the efficiency of the council, he states.

Winther, B. (2020). A Review of the Academic Debate about United Nations Security Council Reform, The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 6(1), 71-101. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/23525207-12340047

Just Different Hats? Comparing UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping

In the past two decades, regional organizations and coalitions of states have deployed more peace operations than the United Nations. Yet most quantitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness focus on UN peacekeeping exclusively, a decision owed to data availability more than to theories about the differential impact of UN and non-UN missions. As a result, we know little about the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping in mitigating violence.
CORINNE BARA and LISA HULTMAN introduce and analyze monthly data on the approximate number of troops, police, and observers in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations between 1993 and 2016.
“Using these data, we show that when accounting for mission size and composition, UN and regional peacekeeping operations are equally effective in mitigating violence against civilians by governments, but only UN troops and police curb civilian targeting by non-state actors,” the authors state in ‘Just Different Hats? Comparing UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping’, published in the journal International Peacekeeping.
“We offer some theoretical reflections on these findings, but the main contribution of the article is the novel dataset on non-UN peacekeeping strength and personnel composition to overcome the near-exclusive focus on UN missions in the scholarship on peacekeeping effectiveness.”
The authors have explored the similarities and differences between UN and non-UN peacekeeping. By providing comparable data on the approximate monthly number of peacekeepers for both UN and non-UN missions, they are able to examine issues relating to their different strengths, compositions, and effects. “One question we ask is whether UN and non-UN missions deploy to different contexts. Our descriptive statistics shows some evidence for this.”
On average, the UN deploys to more violent conflicts than non-UN actors, BARA and HULTMAN state. However, in situations in which the UN and non-UN actors intervene into the same conflict, the non-UN actor is most often the first responder. “This article could not explore these differences and temporal dynamics in more detail, but the question of how the effectiveness of earlier missions influences the effectiveness of missions that take over later deserves more research.”
The effects of these missions also vary. “If we take the size of missions into consideration, is there a difference in the effect between UN and non-UN missions? Our findings suggest that there is, at least when it comes to reducing one-sided violence by rebel groups,” the authors state.
This example is a reminder that the category of non-UN peacekeeping is admittedly a rough mix of different types of missions and that the heterogeneity of non-UN missions ought to be further explored. Moreover, whether missions are deployed by the UN or another organization is perhaps not their most distinguishing feature. Certain UN and non-UN missions may be more comparable to each other than missions within these two organizational categories.
“The data we present here offers the possibility to explore differences between and among UN and non-UN missions further, and hopefully an impetus to overcome the step-motherly treatment of non-UN peacekeeping at least in the quantitative study of peacekeeping effectiveness.”

Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the UNSC

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council’s agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council’s agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed, MARTIN BINDER and JONATHAN GOLUB state.
“To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory,” the authors state in a research article titled ‘Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations Security Council’ published in International Studies Quarterly.
Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, the authors show that the parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5) matter, but they do not determine the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council’s organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the P-5 and the E-10.
“Our findings also have important implications for the Council’s legitimacy, in terms of both performance legitimacy and procedural legitimacy,” BINDER and GOLUB state. “[I]n our conceptualization the UN is more legitimate if devastating conflicts reach the agenda faster.”
For the UNSC’s performance legitimacy, it makes a big difference whether a crisis reaches the Council’s agenda rapidly and is discussed in public, or whether a crisis goes on for a long time without any exposure at a UNSC meeting and no chance of further action. “Our findings are consistent with a legitimate Council that takes its mandate seriously, addressing more promptly conflicts that produce substantial human suffering and massive negative externalities for neighboring countries.”
But the findings also help to assess an important element of the Council’s procedural legitimacy by demonstrating how issues reach the agenda, the authors contend. Do parochial interests of the powerful permanent members skew agenda-setting speed? “We show that narrow P-5 interests definitely affect the speed of agenda setting in important ways, but also that the Council does not appear to be an entirely illegitimate P-5 dominated elite club in which the elected members trade away their influence in exchange for bribes. Instead, the P-5 need to reach out to the E-10, rendering the agenda-setting process more inclusive of a larger set of interests.”
Future research should investigate whether there is a systematic link between the speed with which conflicts reach the UNSC’s agenda and the effect this has on the UN’s success in terms of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, or sanctions, BINDER and GOLUB state. “Pursuing these avenues would contribute to better understanding of how international organizations work, their effectiveness, and their legitimacy.”