Despite their formal power, ANN-MARIE EKENGREN, FREDRIK D. HJORTHEN and ULRIKA MÖLLER remind us, there are important limitations to the influence Council members are able to wield. For one, the capacity of the Council to exercise its authority is highly contingent on the voluntary cooperation of states, which in turn depends on the perceived legitimacy of the Council.
Moreover, a number of circumstances contribute to monopolizing effective decision-making power with the Permanent Five (P5), reducing the role of the Elected Ten (E10) to considering “previously cooked decisions.” In addition to the veto, the P5 has access to the institutional memory of the Council, has more experienced diplomatic staff, and has competence in practices such as ‘penholding’.
Yet this does not appear to have curbed the enthusiasm of other UN members for seeking an elected seat. Instead, there has been an increase in competition, leading to more intensive and elaborate election campaigns. The competitive challenge facing aspiring members is compounded by the increase in UN membership, from 104 in 1963 to 193 in 2018.
Member States seeking an elected seat are now up against more competitors and need to win the support of more countries to secure the required number of votes. Accordingly, securing a nonpermanent seat has been described as “more of a prize than ever”. It might seem, therefore, that the gains of an elected seat outweigh the costs of competing for it. But what exactly do aspiring members hope to achieve?
Departing from the overarching assumption that power and influence is at stake, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER investigate what states think they will achieve by serving on the Council. Their article, ‘A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council: Why Bother?’, published in the journal Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, contributes with a novel systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of why states find a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council attractive.
Three conceptualizations of power—to influence, to network, and to gain status—guide the empirical analysis. A telephone interview survey with diplomatic staff at Member States’ permanent missions to the United Nations in New York provides readers with original and unique empirical knowledge of state perceptions of power.
The candidature for a seat comes with expectations of influencing decision-making, despite modest estimations of the opportunity to have impact, the authors state. Opportunities to network and to gain status are not frequent reasons for a candidature. Diplomats’ estimations are nevertheless higher on the opportunity to actually establish relevant relationships and to gain status brought by a seat.
The most interesting findings of the study are reached by comparing: (1) stated reasons for wanting a seat with estimations of the power-enhancing benefits brought by a seat; and (2) reasons ascribed to other states for wanting a seat with the stated reasons for one’s own state. When diplomats were asked why a seat was of interest, they rated the opportunity to influence the agenda as the main reason. When asked about the benefits of holding an elected seat, they were modest in their ratings of this type of influence. Conversely, they were optimistic in their assessment on the opportunity to establish networks, but this was not among the most important stated reasons for wanting a seat.
The pattern for status was similar, although the difference was not as accentuated; status was not a main reason for wanting a seat, but expectations that an elected seat brings status were rather high.
It might seem puzzling that a main reason for wanting a seat was to influence the agenda when assessments of the opportunity to do so were so modest, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER state. However, this indicates awareness of the actual obstacles facing the elected members and that influence is still greater with than without a seat. Moreover, it may be that improved relations and status are seen by states as (direct or indirect) forms of influence too, making the discrepancy between influence as a reason for seeking a seat and the reported lack of influence on Security Council decision-making less of a puzzle.
Regarding the expectation of stronger relationships with other actors, the results indicate that this was a by-product of the seat and not the main reason for seeking a seat in the first place. The expectation of improved status should be considered in light of the view expressed by many states that any increase in status is temporary and perhaps also limited to UN circles in New York. Hence, the conceptualization of power-enhancing benefits through networking and social interaction helps us understand states’ expectations once the seat is won.
The sense of obligation and ambition to take responsibility for the multilateral order expressed by many diplomats can be interpreted as a will to pursue and promote specific values and norms through the seat, the authors state. By contrast, when diplomats were asked about other states’ reasons for wanting a seat, their will to influence was to a much lesser degree paired with the wish to contribute to the multilateral order, and the aspirations for status were stated as much more important.
The difference in responses regarding their own and other states can mean several things. For one, it could be that, when asked about other states, respondents were more honest and that the interest in status in fact applied to their own state as well. On the other hand, it could be that states generalize based on the existence of a few well-known examples of status seekers. Moreover, the tendency to attach less weight to the wish to influence for promoting values and norms and more weight on status seeking of other states might be interpreted as if states perceive a competition over status in these international settings that they do not want to admit.
Some states might also connect status seeking with small-state behavior and this might be easier to admit for other states than for their own. In addition, some states might want a seat to preserve a certain status and to remain relevant in global politics, while others seek a seat to improve their status and become more relevant.
Seeing status as a power-enhancing benefit paved the way for an intriguing finding in terms of the discrepancy between stated reasons for one’s own state and other states, according to the authors. It points to the relevance of the ongoing move within the literature toward incorporating a social dimension to the understanding of power and influence. The tendency to ascribe collective goals for seeking influence to one’s own state, but not to other states, is another finding that points to the remaining relevance on the debate between international relations theories on self-interested and collective purposes for action as well as with regard to the importance of values and norms in world politics.
“All three conceptualizations of power-enhancing benefits have proved useful in our analysis, albeit to a varying extent and in different ways,” the authors contend. For example, the prevalence on influence as a reason for seeking a seat in the Security Council may be seen to reflect the conceptualization of power that leans toward a material understanding of power consistent with neorealism. On the other hand, the reported emphasis on values and reform seems more in line with the neoliberal view. Finally, the reported presence and relevance of status considerations might be said to reflect more of a social understanding of power in line with the constructivist view.
Although previous studies on the candidatures and election of members to the Security Council have only briefly addressed the question of why states seek an elected seat, the authors state, there are no empirical studies focusing specifically on this topic. “Our article addresses this gap by focusing on the expectations that states have on an elected seat in the Council.”
Even with the modest response rate taken into account, it gives a substantial contribution to our understanding of why states run for a seat. “We believe this article opens the way for important future research on states’ reasons for international cooperation and interaction, in relation to a seat in the Council as well as in relation to other forms of international representation.”
Looking ahead, EKENGREN, HJORTHEN and MÖLLER state, it would be relevant to investigate how states with different characteristics relate to the three different power-enhancing benefits and by doing so control for some possibly important background variables: Do middle-range powers have greater expectations (than smaller states) on the opportunity to influence the agenda in different institutional settings? Do states with a lower level of international integration have greater expectations regarding the opportunity for social interactions? Do smaller states have greater expectations of status through an elected seat in the Council, or in other international organizations?
In addition, structured case comparisons would be beneficial for the purpose of analyzing whether and how the campaigns for international representation reflect the described expectations. Do states with high expectations on influence, networking, or status invest more time and money in the campaigns? And are the campaigns designed differently depending on what states hope to achieve through a seat?
Ekengren, A., Hjorthen, F. D., & Möller, U. (2020). A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 26(1), 21-45. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02601007
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