The Charm Offensive: Peacekeeping and Policy in China

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By MARISSA GIBSON

China is already a regional great power and as it continues to expand economically, politically, and militarily, it must be careful to retain its image as a peaceful state concerned with international peace, security, and harmonious co-existence, writes
Based upon this analysis, China has undergone a significant change since the 1970s and as it has opened its doors to the international community it has emerged as a rapidly developing power. Its relationship with peacekeeping has demonstrated that even its strict beliefs about sovereignty and non-intervention can be bent in some circumstances, as seen by its actions with respect to Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, and Sudan. Peacekeeping has allowed China to project the image of an atypical and responsible power that is deeply concerned with the maintenance and protection of international peace and security. Chinese peacekeeping troops have “…built and repaired over 8,700 km of roads and 270 bridges, cleared over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transported over 600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million km, and treated 79,000 patients.”63 This is a far cry from the days of refusing to vote on peacekeeping resolutions and the denial of financial and troop contributions.
As Chinese foreign policy has broadened, peacekeeping has reflected these changes. Its image as a responsible power and its increasing flexibility regarding the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention have been demonstrated in its increasing participation in peacekeeping operations. China’s approach to modern peacekeeping is consistent with that of a middle power in its policy development, which has been defined as professing a multilateral approach to building peace, a willingness to compromise, an understanding of middle-power limitations, and a tendency to take a targeted approach to international problems through a ‘helpful fixer’ role.64 Its focus upon peaceful development is supplemented by its PKO participation.
Finally, peacekeeping provides an opportunity to gain operational experience for the PLA, although it is certainly more limited than the experience that could be gained through armed conflict. Military-to-military dialogue and cooperation, the development of military capabilities, and military modernization have all improved due to participation in peacekeeping. China’s defence policy continues to reaffirm its commitment to sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful development – all of which is seen in its behaviour regarding PKOs. With little conventional experience in warfare, peacekeeping provides ‘boots on the ground’ knowledge and military power projection that does not exacerbate the China threat theory.
In summation, peacekeeping has provided a platform for China to expand its global presence in a relatively non-threatening manner, to build relationships with other nations, and to develop its military capabilities. China’s peacekeeping interests are not wholly altruistic however, and there is much to be gained from the peacekeeping foothold established in Africa, including the possibility of lucrative trade agreements with resource-rich nations. Nonetheless, China remains an actor that is motivated by careful consideration of the costs and benefits of its peacekeeping deployment, as evidenced by Darfur, and will likely continue to do so in order to maintain its international standing among global powers such as the U.S. and Russia. It will be interesting to track its continuing investment in PKOs in the coming years and whether or not China will consider providing support for ‘coalitions-of-the-willing’ as a means to increase its standing among the international community.

The preceding text is the conclusion of Second Lieutenant Marissa Gibson's article 'The Charm Offensive: Peacekeeping and Policy in China' published in the Canadian Military Journal Vol. 19, No. 1.

Peacekeeping After Brexit

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What is the state of the United Kingdom’s current engagement with the UN, where might this go in the future, and what possible impacts would leaving the European Union have on the ability for the UK to influence the United Nations’ actions on a political level?
These were among the questions raised at a roundtable on September 7, 2018 at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Organized by the British International Studies Association Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Working Group in partnership with RUSI, the roundtable took as its starting point the broader question of the role of multilateral institutions in UK foreign and defense policy after the UK formally leaves the EU, and sought to identify and understand the role of peace operations within the framework of the ‘Global Britain’ agenda.
Some 30 delegates from academia and the policy and NGO sectors provided perspectives on how different forms of engagement with UN peace operations could strengthen the UK government’s commitment to supporting a rules-based international system.
A challenge underlying the roundtable was that the UK has yet to formally leave the EU, write DAVID CURRAN GEORGINA HOLMES and PHILIP CUNLIFFE in this conference report capturing the key themes and issues raised by the participants.
Related to this was the limited understanding (beyond Global Britain) as to the UK’s current foreign policy objectives, and what role the UN plays in them. “There appears to be little policy which indicates how approaches to the UN will alter as a result of Brexit,” according to the report.
There is a need for a cross-governmental strategy to guide how the UK engages with UN operations, and the extent to which the UK could maintain or build upon its present commitment after 2020, the roundtable heard.
The UK has built a modest but strong base of engagement in the field through UN Mission in South Sudan. When placed alongside the UK’s political activities in the UN Security Council, and having effective people in key positions, the opportunity for stepping up engagement is clear. This, however, should be undertaken in a coordinated manner, based on where the UK can best complement UN requirements, the participants stressed.

Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War

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Over the last two decades, international actors have devoted increasing attention to managing intrastate conflicts. A substantial body of research has suggested that various efforts can make significant contributions to the resolution of such conflict. Despite these efforts, however, a large number of civil wars are still fought.
Analysis by KYLE BEARDSLEY, DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, and PETER B. WHITE suggests that the positive effect of international efforts is not limited to conflict resolution. Rather, peacekeeping and mediation can actually reduce the level of killing in ongoing wars as well as resolve them, they write in an article titled ‘Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War’ published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Although previous work has explored the relationship between peacekeeping and conflict severity, the authors state that their study is the first to show a violence-reducing effect of mediation and the first to examine the interactive effect of mediation and peacekeeping.
“These findings are important because they suggest that international actions have a violence-reducing effect that has, with the exception of peacekeeping, to date been unrecognized,” the authors contend. Many of the conflicts that receive the most international attention – such as those in Syria and South Sudan – are incredibly bloody, and the level of violence can suggest that the ability of third parties to do anything constructive is limited. “Our analyses suggest, however, that, on average, civil wars would be even bloodier without international efforts,” the authors state.
The presence of severe armed conflict in the face of international intervention does not necessarily represent the categorical failure of international efforts.
The results suggest that scholars and policy makers evaluating the success of international efforts should use a broader metric than conflict resolution. To fully gauge the effectiveness of third-party efforts, researchers should examine the severity of violence as well. This is particularly important in the context of analyses that suggest that strategies such as peacekeeping and mediation may lead to a short-term decrease in hostilities at the cost of potential conflict recurrence. This trade-off may very well exist but determining whether these strategies are still worthwhile requires fully understanding the impact they have on the dynamics of conflict, such as the level of violence.
The authors state that their analysis also suggests that efficacy in third-party efforts requires the investment of significant resources. “We did not find much of a pacifying effect for indirect mediation. Rather, direct mediation and concurrent deployments of UN peacekeepers – both of which require substantial attention and commitment –have the largest effects. Much of the discussion of conflict management efforts by states and bodies such as the UN focuses on the costs, and these costs can be substantial. We show that the benefits can be as well.”

Supporting Peace After Civil War: What Kind of International Engagement Can Make a Difference?

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How can international actors effectively support peace after civil war?
Analyzing combinations of peace support provided during the first five years of 36 post-civil war episodes since 1990, CHARLOTTE FIEDLER, JÖRN GRÄVINGHOLT and KARINA MROSS conclude that international peacebuilding can clearly make a difference. More specifically, their findings show that:
• contrary to concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of democratization, the majority of successful cases are in fact characterized by substantial international support in the field of politics and governance in democratizing contexts;
• only combined international efforts across all types of support can help prevent renewed conflict in contexts of a high risk of recurrence; and
• countries that did not receive any substantial peace support experienced conflict recurrence within five years.
In a briefing paper titled Supporting Peace After Civil War: What Kind of International Engagement Can Make a Difference? for the German Development Institute, the authors recommend the following to the international community when faced with post-civil war situations:
• Engage substantially in post-conflict countries. International peacebuilding can be effective, even where there is a high structural risk of conflict recurrence. While success will never be guaranteed, countries that receive substantial international support often remain peaceful, whereas all countries that were neglected by the international community experienced conflict recurrence.
• Pay particular attention, and provide substantial support, to the field of politics and governance in post-conflict countries that begin to democratize. While it is well known that democratization processes are conflict prone, donor engagement geared towards supporting such processes can help mitigate conflict and contribute to peace. When a post-conflict country has decided to embark on political reforms donors should offer governance support to help overcome potential destabilizing effects of democratization processes.
• Invest in an international approach that encompasses all areas of peacebuilding early on after the end of a civil war. Especially in contexts with a high structural risk of renewed violent conflict, the chances of sustained peace are increased by simultaneous support for security, institutions, livelihoods and societal conflict transformation.

Reintegrating Syrian Militias: Mechanisms, Actors, and Shortfalls

The process of reintegrating Syrian militias or rebels into the regime forces needs to happen as part of an integrated national program of rehabilitation, writes HAID HAID in an article for the Carnegie Middle East Center.

A classic, successful DDR scenario, especially after a divisive civil war, involves standing down the combatant irregulars, collecting up their weapons, and implementing programs to ease their path back to civilian life, or integrating them as part of the regular armed forces, he states. All of this should be done within the context of, and by reinforcing, a comprehensive peace agreement, which is usually overseen by international powers given the lack of trust that normally prevails.

None of this applies to the Syrian case, HAID writes. “In the place of a nationwide negotiated peace agreement, there has been a series of half-hearted reconciliations imposed by the regime after besieging and battering rebel strongholds into submission.” 

Reintegrating irregulars, be they pro-regime militias or former rebels, into the regime forces has taken place piecemeal and not as part of an integrated national program of rehabilitation. In neither case have mechanisms been set up to help former fighters adjust to civilian life.

In addition, there are many obstacles that have been highlighted by the efforts so far made, HAID continues. “Turning a civilian militia fighter with no formal training or discipline into a reliable soldier requires an investment of manpower and finance that the regime lacks.” Simply adopting entire loyalist or rebel units may temporarily solve some problems but does not amount to serious reintegration. 

Lacking professional training, discipline, and regular command structures, and in many cases maintaining divided loyalties, these forces can be of only limited utility and dependability for the regime. It has also done nothing to reform its military and security forces and eliminate the sectarianism prevailing throughout: these forces remain corrupt, brutal, and incompetent, factors that will further bedevil reintegration and trust building.

As beholden as the regime is to Iran and Russia for its survival, HAID writes, it has not been able to resist the inroads into state sovereignty and the implanting of foreign influence represented by the apparently competitive sponsorship of elements in the military and security structures. 

“That process may provide a temporary fix for the regime’s financial and manpower deficits, but in the long term it will complicate any true attempt at national reconstruction and reintegration. It could potentially turn the country’s military and security fields into an arena for regional and international power contests, if they are not already.”

The African Union and Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Burundi

Amid Burundi’s intensifying domestic crisis in December 2015, the African Union (AU) took the unprecedented step of threatening to use military force against the government’s will in order to protect civilians caught up in the conflict.
In an article for the Journal of Modern African Studies, posted by Brussels-based EGMONT The Royal Institute for International Relations, NINA WILÉN and PAUL D. WILLIAMS trace the background to this decision and analyze the effectiveness and credibility of the AU’s use of coercive diplomacy as a tool of conflict management.
After its usual range of conflict management tools failed to stem the Burundian crisis, the AU Commission and Peace and Security Council (PSC) tried a new type of military compellence by invoking Article 4(h) of the Union’s Constitutive Act. The authors argue that the threatened intervention never materialized because of 1) the Burundian government’s astute diplomacy and 2) several African autocrats’ resistance to setting a precedent for future interventions where concerns about civilian protection overrode state sovereignty.
But this was not a complete defeat for the AU, WILÉN and WILLIAMS state. “The Burundi case showed the AU Commission was willing and able to address an impending crisis that directly related to its mandate to prevent violent conflicts.”
From late 2014, the AU used various diplomatic instruments, including the deployment of special envoys, a high-level panel and later, human right observers and military experts. When these failed to persuade the Burundian government to open negotiations, the PSC used targeted sanctions to try and diffuse the crisis. “The PSC’s unprecedented invocation of Article 4(h) in the immediate aftermath of the deadly episode of 11-12 December 2015 was an innovative attempt to reduce violence against civilians and put pressure on the government when all previous measures had failed.”
Yet, the AU did not directly tackle the principal cause of Burundi’s crisis: President Nkurunziza’s controversial bid for a third term. It seems clear that most observers, including the EAC’s ministers of justice and the chairperson of the AU Commission viewed a third term for Nkurunziza as unconstitutional and it certainly broke the terms of the Arusha agreement, for which the AU was a guarantor. Yet the AU’s room for maneuver was constrained for two main reasons. First, the May 2015 ruling by Burundi’s Constitutional Court in favor of Nkurunziza’s third term meant that legally, Nkurunziza’s continued rule was constitutional, despite the serious doubts about the Court’s independence reflected by the vice-president’s decision to flee the country immediately after the verdict was delivered.
Second, the EAC’s leaders were unwilling to criticize the extension of presidential term limits in Burundi given their similar behavior in their own states. Discussion of this issue was effectively killed off when the East African Community (EAC) gained the lead role for mediating the negotiations to resolve Burundi’s crisis.
The decision not to forcibly deploy the African Protection and Prevention Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) without the host government’s consent shows the abiding power of the norm of non-intervention and the controversial nature of Article 4(h) in Africa, despite the AU’s new unofficial slogan of moving ‘from non-intervention to non-indifference’.
“The decision also showed how there can be different dynamics for the PSC convening at ambassadorial level compared to meetings at the level of heads of state or foreign ministers,” the authors state.
In retrospect, the decision not to deploy MAPROBU also made it easier for the government of Burundi to reject the deployment of a UN police mission, which was established in UN Security Council resolution 2303 of 29 July 2016. It has also probably reduced the AU’s credibility should it wish to issue a similar compellent threat in the future. On the other hand, it is possible that the PSC’s threat of Article 4(h) helped prevent an even worse spiral of violence that might have occurred after the clashes in mid-December 2015 and that a forcible military intervention might have escalated Burundi’s crisis regardless of the good intentions behind it.

MINIMUM ORDER: The Role of the UN Security Council in an Era of Major Power Competition

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Amid the uncertainty surrounding the future of international relations, what role can the United Nations Security Council play?
In exploring what the body can do in managing geopolitical tensions in the future, RICHARD GOWAN frames the problems the United Nations is facing differently.
In a new report published by the United Nations University Center for Policy Research, GOWAN aims to identify the minimum level of P5 cooperation necessary for the Security Council to play a significant role in managing major power competition, and how to preserve this minimum.
The United Nations has never suffered from a shortage of proposals for how to improve the Security Council, he writes. Experts began tabling ideas to overcome P5 divisions in the early 1950s. “History has shown that technical roadmaps for resolving the council’s problems normally disappear into diplomatic oblivion.”
In the report, titled ‘MINIMUM ORDER: The role of the Security Council in an era of major power competition’, offers a diagnosis of how poorly the Council is faring as well as a warning about where this may lead. “There is little political point in outlining overly precise terms of a solution to these problems, given the intensity and complexity of the divisions and the crises currently in play,” he writes. “Rather than conclude with specific recommendations, therefore, it may be better to end with a challenge.”
It is clear from current Council dynamics that the forum is drifting towards a situation in which it fails to maintain its basic post-Cold War roles, GOWAN contends. “It is equally evident that this bears significant risks for the P5, even if their behavior does not reflect this.”
The basic challenge for the P5 is to recognize the fragility of their position and to address the need to restore some stability within the council before matters deteriorate much further. It would be useful if P5 members were to initiate – quietly or publicly – some sort of strategic dialogue about how to maintain the basic functions of the council in policing non-proliferation, easing crises and dealing with terrorists. Such a dialogue might be linked to handling specific problems, like the aftermath of the Syrian war, or promoting specific P5-branded initiatives to restore faith in aspects of the non-proliferation regime. “Exactly what such a process should look like is something for all members of the P5 to discuss. This report is a prompt for them to do so.”
If P5 governments are not open to a worthwhile formal strategic dialogue at this time – and their actions suggest that they are not – it may be necessary for security institutes from the five to start probing these questions in a preparatory fashion, GOWAN states. “This may be a long, painful and perhaps quixotic process. The decline of Security Council diplomacy is real, and the need for some sort of vision of what can be salvaged from the mess is growing ever more urgent.”

Reaching Internally Displaced Persons to Achieve the 2030 Agenda

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The specific needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those stuck in situations of protracted displacement, require states, the United Nations and other humanitarian and development actors to address longer-term challenges and conceptualize, develop, and implement policies that will provide sustainable solutions for these vulnerable populations.
“Addressing both the immediate and the longer term needs of IDPs may require challenging existing practices and mindsets,” according to a new issue brief by the International Peace Institute. Humanitarian actors, traditionally focused on immediate emergency needs, must address protracted displacement. States with high levels of internal displacement must address the needs of IDPs in their implementation of the 2030 Agenda, write ALICE DEBARRE, ARCHIBALD HENRY and MASOOMA RAHMATY.
The international community also has an important role to play in supporting states in this endeavor. For humanitarian and development actors in particular, strategic coordination of efforts, and, where feasible, joint planning and cooperation, will be key.
The authors state that the following recommendations will help ensure that states, the UN, and other humanitarian and development actors are adequately addressing the long-term needs of IDPs:
• Member states should turn their commitment to “leave no one behind” into policy and programming by including IDPs’ concerns in their development planning. In their efforts to ensure that they are on track to implement the 2030 Agenda, states should address internal displacement in their development plans. They should also include information on IDPs in their voluntary national reviews. Ensuring that IDPs’ concerns are being considered will also require that they be included in development budgets at the local, regional, and national levels. Inter-ministerial cooperation will be essential for all of this.
• Humanitarian and development actors should systematically remind national governments of their obligations vis-à-vis IDPs. The core responsibility of supporting IDPs lies with affected states, but humanitarian and development actors can encourage and support member states to implement the 2030 Agenda in ways that include the unique needs of displaced populations.
• The UN and other humanitarian and development actors should strive for closer coordination and cooperation when addressing the needs of IDPs and finding sustainable solutions, particularly in situations of protracted displacement. Existing efforts, such as those highlighted in this issue brief, should be strengthened and streamlined.
• In designing and implementing IDP-inclusive development policies, all stakeholders should ensure that data informing these policies is reliable and takes into account the voices of those affected. For development policies and programs to be tailored to the situation they aim to address, including its gender dimensions, they need to be built on solid data, recognition of the population’s needs, and an understanding of how those needs can best be addressed.

The UN and Atrocity Crimes: The Over-Politicization of Decision-Making in the Security Council

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There is much evidence of the omnipresent over-politicization of issues in the United Nations Security Council, writes MARTIN DAVENAS in a working paper published by University College London’s Global Governance Institute.
“First, one negative vote from any permanent member, the national interests of which are fully ‘globalized’, can paralyze the whole organization and therefore let mass violations of human rights continue unhindered.”
Secondly, he states, the authority of the UN is undermined by those states that were initially considered collectively responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as those states that resist collective responses to atrocity crimes because they accuse the organization of being partial. Furthermore, balancing the need for sanctioning or intervening in states for the enforcement of peace in the long term, and the present protection of the concerned population's human rights, are a controversial and political issue in the Security Council, which ultimately generates distrust for the organization, hence the legitimacy deficit affecting the UN.
Finally, the UN’s credibility is greatly affected by its past failures, including situations where interventions have had direct detrimental effects on human rights as well as those where UN mandates have been manipulated for the attainment of national political and/or economic advantages. This further contributes to the ‘delegitimization’ of the UN, since legitimacy is nothing but the belief that the institution must be obeyed.
The UN was, from the beginning, susceptible to over-politicization, fueled by institutionalized inequalities. Compliance with or resistance of UN institutions are used as an instrument of political posturing on the international stage. “Consequently, one could consider that the UN, a most ambitious idea, may have been too modern at the time of the drafting of the Charter, in the sense that states clung to a traditional approach to international politics and diplomacy, which was not compatible with the collective acknowledgement that international cooperation was vital in order to uphold human rights and humanitarian law,” DAVENAS writes. “In the end, it appears that the disagreements between the powerful states were too great for them to carry the collective responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.”
The UN was envisioned to be a forum where states could coordinate their efforts to tackle international problems, and it has created a body of international law to promote economic and social development and advance international peace and security. From the codification of international law, to the judicial settlement of disputes and the quest for accountability, the UN could be considered the embryo of a real supranational organization with authority over its members, but it is still tainted by the political views and ambitions of its most prominent members.
The systematic over-politicization of issues in the Security Council discredits the organization and its legitimacy. Logically, an international organization supposedly representing the whole international community should only act in the interests of that community. In order to do so, the UN needs to be more detached and independent from individual concerns of state actors, which necessarily implies that ‘Great Powers’ must relinquish at least some of their privileges, so that the UN can fulfil its function of ‘center for harmonizing the actions of nations’.
While there is a certain consensus on the necessity to reform the Security Council, there are disagreements on the changes that need to be made. The most frequent propositions are the addition of both permanent and non-permanent members for the sake of representativity as well as changing the Security Council’s working methods, notably restriction of the use of the veto. For instance, the ‘G4’, namely Brazil, India, Japan and Germany, have been bidding to obtain a permanent seat at the Security Council. It is true that these states' economic growth and political influence give them a good claim on any future permanent seat in the Security Council, but in the framework of an organ dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security, it is doubtful that economic might is a relevant criterion. It would also be difficult to extend permanent membership because there will always be opposition from rival bidders or influential neighboring states. If the Security Council is to be extended, the principle of fair regional distribution has to be respected.
As a response to the G4 request, the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ movement advocated for maintaining five permanent members but having twenty elected members. There would be six African states, five Asian states, four Latin American and Caribbean States, three from Western Europe and Other States and two from Eastern Europe. Marcello Spatafora, former Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, said in 2005, while discussing the United for Consensus proposition, that the credibility of the organization and its process of reform was at stake, and that these reforms could not be dictated by power or money, but had to be dictated by principles. The consequences of veto use so far suggests that there should not be more states able to wield that power, as it will likely hinder the work of the Security Council even more.
In the context of atrocity crimes and mass violations of human rights, DAVENAS stresses, there is a need to separate the discussion from political concerns: the question of how to prevent or put an end to gross violations of basic human rights is about morals, not about politics. “If states cannot be trusted to forego national interests or political advantages even in such terrible contexts, then the veto power should not be given to new states, and its use should be restricted for those that already have it.”
This sort of proposal has already been made: for instance, the S5, a group of five states, namely Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, suggested in 2005 that permanent members should, upon casting a veto, provide ‘an explanation for [their] decision that is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and relevant international law’, and further called on the P5 to ‘refrain from using the veto 'to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crime and crimes against humanity’. Unsurprisingly, this proposal encountered strong opposition from some permanent members.
Since the Syrian conflict, however, various proposals have been made, aimed at improving the work of the Security Council in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. For instance, the French and Mexican initiative of 2015 advocates for the suspension of veto powers in situations of mass atrocities. The proposal gives responsibility to the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Council ‘situations involving, or likely leading to, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes’. Truly, if permanent members could be persuaded to relinquish this power in cases of atrocities, it would constitute a major improvement as the Council could not be a bystander to these atrocities.
The Secretary-General, as an independent actor in the UN, could raise the matter ‘automatically’ as soon as alarming reports appear, and when UN experts would reach the certitude that such crimes may take place, the veto power would be suspended. This sort of reform is not entirely far-fetched, in the sense that already France and the United Kingdom have not used the veto since 1989. Further, in September 2015, then-French President François Hollande pledged, at the UNGA, that ‘France will never use its power of veto where there have been mass atrocities’, and the United Kingdom also has reiterated that it would not use its veto to block credible action aimed at stopping mass atrocities.
Still, without real determination from other permanent members, these proposals will have to be negotiated, and compromises found between the ‘Big Five’, since the United States, Russia and China would only accept to give up this power in return for insurances or compensations, which might end up undermining the reach of these reforms.
Nevertheless, DAVENAS concludes, it is an encouraging thought that some states are willing to freely relinquish their special powers and thus shift priorities in order to focus on attaining international peace and security and respect for human rights.

Humanitarian Action and Foreign Policy: Balancing Interests and Values

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Using a foreign policy lens to understand how states engage in humanitarian action, and juggle competing interests, values and priorities, is a powerful way to consider both DAC and non-DAC donors against a common framework – as well as offering suggestions on how best to engage them in advocating for more effective humanitarian action, a new report by the Overseas Development Institute stresses.
In their study titled ‘Humanitarian action and foreign policy: Balancing interests and values’, BARNABY WILLITTS-KING, SHERINE EL TARABOULSI-MCCARTHY and JOHN BRYANT explore how the humanitarian action undertaken by different states interacts with their foreign policy in a period of geopolitical turbulence. They show that state humanitarian action is constantly evolving in an elaborate relationship with other foreign policy priorities.
“There are multiple examples of where these other interests take the focus away from humanitarian priorities, such as when national security and trade opportunities dominate,” they write. “But to argue for the depoliticization of aid is both unrealistic and misses the opportunity to harness the power of states – both DAC and non-DAC – for better humanitarian outcomes by engaging with them differently.”
Humanitarian action is inescapably part of foreign policy, and needs to be considered in that light, the report stresses. Aid can be at once humanitarian and in the national interest, despite this being uncomfortable territory for humanitarians. These two goals need not be intrinsically opposed – but also where they are in conflict – need to be better defined and explained.
The authors make the following recommendations to states, donors and humanitarian agencies:

Understand the politics
Applying a foreign policy lens can help in better understanding how countries can engage effectively beyond donorship. The politics of aid is a reality. Understanding the bureaucratic and political drivers of donor decision-making is therefore key to engaging constructively and effectively with that process. In the current climate of realist approaches to foreign policy, this means engaging with the language of ‘aid in the national interest’ and finding ways to express and promote principled and values-based approaches in those terms – but without being co-opted or compromising these values. Where necessary, realist narratives should be countered with arguments based on values.
Humanitarian actors must recognize that bureaucracies are complex and not as monolithic as they may appear and should give greater priority to finding champions and opportunities to influence people and processes. Engaging directly with diplomats for example – whether in the field or at headquarters – rather than just aid officials, offers scope to understand and influence the wider context within which states engage in crises.
Building stronger bridges between the diplomatic and humanitarian parts of governments to forge a pragmatic partnership based on more mutual understanding of motivations and drivers is critical. Rather than seeing diplomats as the ‘dark side’ of government, their role in managing multiple interests means that they need to be engaged if humanitarians are to better communicate the reasons for a humanitarian focus. Keeping an open mind towards the opportunities of a more politically informed, constructive engagement with foreign policymaking should strengthen rather than undermine humanitarian priorities.

Recognize diversity in donorship
In advocacy terms, there is a role for civil society – primarily domestic NGOs – to push their governments to clarify how they balance competing interests, why decisions appear to go against stated humanitarian policy, or where different policies are incompatible.
Civil society space is essential to ensuring a critical voice. Donors must continue to support independent civil society, both at crisis level, through support to locally led responses, and internationally.
Recognizing that all governments, whether DAC or non-DAC make (usually rational) choices between different priorities argues for a deeper understanding of what drives different states’ decisions, so that advocacy can be tailored to their specific frames of reference. This applies particularly to relationships between DAC and non-DAC donors. While being realistic about the limits of such partnerships, DAC/GHD donors should broaden their fora or find alternatives for discussing policy towards countries in crisis.
While DAC donors continue to provide the bulk of reported contributions to the ‘formal’ humanitarian system, comprising the UN, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs, there is increasing recognition of the role of non-DAC donors in funding or operating in different crises. Beyond simple caricature, their motivations are in reality just as complex and multifaceted as those of the DAC donors. There is a need to recognize the different advantages and disadvantages of different donors, whether through geography or relationships in particular crises, for example as a result of colonial history or shared religious affiliation. Different donors also prioritize different sectors or geographic areas for funding, for example Australia’s focus on the Asia-Pacific, or the Gulf States’ preference for the Arab world. Better appreciation of and transparency around diverse approaches is needed to do aggregate each state’s efforts, rather than assuming there is a single ideal donor model. Relationships are being strengthened between DAC and non-DAC donors, particularly at field/crisis level, but further efforts are needed to cultivate stronger institutional relationships based on shared interests and a more nuanced understanding of diverse approaches to humanitarian action. This could take the form of exchanges for institution building or joint research.

Strive for transparency
States need to be more explicit and transparent about their humanitarian commitments, and where these commitments collide or conflict with other objectives and policies, where they are de-prioritized, or where they align with the national interest. Models of crisis-level donor coordination according to comparative advantage should be documented and highlighted, for example in DAC peer reviews.

Revisit humanitarian principles across cultures
Central to building credible relationships between ‘rising’ and ‘established’ donors will be an appreciation of the different values underlying their responses – but also identifying where there is common ground. Principles can exclude, but they can also be made operationally meaningful.
Emerging platforms for non-Western civil society and foundations, such as the Arab Foundations Forum, can be galvanized to provide an opportunity for collaboration with international actors, and for investments in in-depth and sustained debate on aid policies around the world.

The United Nations and Middle Eastern Security

"The traditional approach of peacekeeping in the Middle East has now evolved into an approach that also seeks to work towards regional security by emphasizing human security," writes ALLISON MILLER. "This reframing has resulted in the UN supplying developmental and humanitarian aid in various ways.
"The UN recognizes that there needs to be unity across every ethnic and religious line to continue addressing the situation in the Middle East. The conflicts currently facing the Middle East have created the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War and this population of vulnerable people create a difficult challenge for neighboring countries attempting to aid them.
"The level of human suffering in the Middle East increases the concern over security in a multitude of ways, such as the exploitation of vulnerable populations or the lack of resources being provided to address basic health care and trauma. The UN needs the continuing support of the international community in order to continue their humanitarian and protective missions in the Middle East. Failing to garner the support of the international community could prove to be detrimental to the security of the Middle East in the coming years.
"The UN will need to remain in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. With the presence of ISIS winding down, the war in Yemen, increasing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and other regional issues the UN is able to fill the role of a moderating third party. The UN is also providing critical support to the people in areas that are subject to degrading and dehumanizing conditions every day. However, as an institution of global governance, the UN cannot continue operating at its current capacity in the Middle East without unwavering support of the international community. If anything, key actors that are involved with the Middle East should be doing more to support UN efforts, be it financially or by other means.
"As time progresses the UN should attempt to involve regional actors, such as the Arab League, more often in attempt to decrease their role in governance. The Arab League has been involved, but it appears as though this involvement has been limited. Given that the Arab League is a prominent regional organization in the Middle East, they need to be given a more active platform and presence with the UN. Doing so is necessary to both create and promote any possibilities for peace and stability."

Reforming the United Nations Security Council: An Assessment of the ‘Group of Four’ Proposal

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ADRIAN KANTILAL SHAH, considering the major proposals to reform the structure of the United Nations Security Council, concludes that the one put forward by the Group of Four (Japan, India, Brazil and Germany) is the most ideal. In addition to giving permanent seats to the aforementioned four countries, the proposal envisages two permanent seats for African states. Four additional nonpermanent seats would be created, one each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
While providing member states that have made substantial contributions in maintaining international peace and security an opportunity to continue doing so on a permanent basis, SHAH contends, the Group of Four proposal achieves the main goal of structural reform: making the Security Council more representative of today’s world.
In other words, apart from providing better representation to regions that have historically been underrepresented in the world’s top decision-making body, the proposal adds permanent seat holders. “This is important because it acts as a buffer to the power and control which is currently exercised by the Permanent Five Member States,” SHAH states. This element sets it apart from the Uniting for Consensus proposal, which focuses specifically on creating new non-permanent seats which, in effect, maintains the current 'class-system' within the Security Council.
While it can be argued that the Group of Four proposal, too, maintains the same ‘class-system’ by adding permanent members, SHAH writes, it must be viewed against its transformative potential through its recognition of Member-States that have grown economically as well as militarily as well as the need for better representation to regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America in a proportionate manner.
Of the other dimensions of reform, he states, the Security Council in recent years has made progress in re-assessing and amending its working methods, thereby working toward building greater accountability and transparency. The question of the veto is more complicated. Here, too, there is growing recognition that exercise of the veto should be restricted in order to permit the Security Council to carry out its work more effectively.

International Support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force: A Fragile Military Response

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The Sahel Joint Force (JF-G5S) initiative represents a broader tendency of seeking ‘African solutions to African problems’ on a continent where Western states are reluctant to deploy troops due to domestic political and budgetary constraints, writes SIGNE MARIE COLD-RAVNKILDE in a new policy brief for the Danish Institute for International Studies. However, the force is still far from operational, and it is questionable what the force can actually achieve given the circumstances on the ground.
"France has been the most active European member-state in the Sahel in terms of military engagement. Yet after four years of deploying 4,000 soldiers to its counterinsurgency operation, Barkhane, French resources are overstretched, and new partners are needed to complement their fight against terrorism in the Sahara," she writes.
"[T]apping into a broader discussion of the UN’s suitability in asymmetrical warfare, the direct counterinsurgency mandate of JF-G5S was a much-requested add-on to the UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane. Since the deployment of more than 13,000 of MINUSMA’s troops in 2013, of which about 35% originate from the G5 states, regional actors have expressed concerns that the UN has not done enough to counter terrorism. As jihadist violence has grown steadily in Mali’s cross-border regions outside the scope of MINUSMA’s mandate, the incentives of neighbouring states to engage in counterinsurgency operations have increased.
Teething problems risk becoming permanent financial, institutional and legitimacy deficits of the force, COLD-RAVNKILDE writes. "For the JF-G5S to become operational, its international partners must increase sustained financial and logistical support while ensuring that accountability mechanisms and human rights frameworks are adequately developed and implemented. However, even if operational, the JF-G5S alone cannot solve the root causes of long-standing security challenges deeply embedded in historical conflict dynamics and aggravated local grievances. This would require the G5 states and their partners prioritise human security and targeted development activities in remote and neglected cross-border regions."

Use of Force in Humanitarian Crises: Addressing the Limitations of UN Security Council Authorization

"While the use of force without explicit UN authorization may be perceived as pushing the limits of international law," PAUL R. WILLIAMS and SOPHIE PEARLMAN argue, "a framework helps to ensure that use of force will fit under R2P." The authors propose the following criteria:
(1) a prima facie case must be established that atrocity crimes are occurring or are about to occur;
(2) peaceful options have been exhausted;
(3) the Security Council is unable to act in a timely and appropriate manner;
(4) any military force used must be limited to low-intensity options designed to protect populations and must be carried out in such a way as to limit collateral damage;
(5) the use of low-intensity military force must be authorized by a legitimate authority, which could include the UN General Assembly, regional organizations, or international coalitions;
(6) the intervention must come at the request of credible opposition groups that represent victims of atrocity crimes and shall be done collectively by members of the
international community; and
(7) the use of force should be followed up with or integrated into a larger strategy and policy for addressing the humanitarian crisis.
"[Such a framework] would allow for interventions to protect civilians in situations where the Security Council is gridlocked but a rogue state is actively harming or plans to harm its people and would codify a customary international legal norm for humanitarian intervention. Moreover, this framework would provide opportunities for justifying the use of force along the lines of international law and for the U.S. to cite international law as a legal justification for its actions."

The Russian Federation’s Involvement in Peace Missions After the Dissolution of the USSR

Until the 1970s, the USSR’s involvement in peacekeeping missions under the UN was moderate, mainly due to the confrontation with the United States, MICHAŁ ROMAŃCZUK writes. Only after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation began to develop moderate international cooperation as part of the UN peacekeeping force during the Balkan crisis in 1991–1992. Later, after completing the mission in the Balkans at the beginning of the 21st century, the involvement of the Russian Federation in such missions began to decrease.
By sending so-called peace missions to post-Soviet areas, ROMAŃCZUK states, the Russian Federation strives to implement its own foreign policy priorities. “To this end, it uses instruments such as supporting politically and militarily regimes and states that support the Russian authorities. The aim of engaging the Russian peacekeeping forces in the post-Soviet area is to strive to maintain a dominant position in this area, which illustrates Russia’s actions interfering in the internal affairs of the countries located there.”
Although they are called peace forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), these contingents in fact mostly consist of Russian soldiers. “Often their actions go beyond the legal framework and favor one of the parties to the conflict.” In addition, the Russian Federation does not allow the introduction of branches under international auspices, fearing that it will not have control over them. Such actions are not conducive to the stabilization of crisis situations. The Russian Federation has often fueled conflicts between the warring parties in pursuit of their own vested interests, and participation in peace-keeping operations in post-Soviet countries was also seen as a way to gain political influence over this area.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Causes for Failure and Continuing Relevance

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Decades after the deployment of the first peacekeeping operation (PKO)—United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)—in 1948, the United Nations cannot boast of too many successes, writes A.K. BARDALAI. The continued relevance of UN PKOs has thus come under criticism.
In order to determine whether UN PKOs are still relevant, it is necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the reasons/factors for their success and failure, and thereafter assess their performance, he asserts in an article titled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Causes for Failure and Continuing Relevance" in the Journal of Defence Studies.
Based on his personal experience of peacekeeping and prior research, BARDALAI seeks to highlight a few factors that have an overriding influence on the outcome of a PKO. He also attempts to provide a perspective on the relevance of the PKO in context of the challenges they face regarding planning, deployment and execution of such operations.
"The situation surrounding the conflict and circumstances leading to the peace agreement, availability of the consent of the disputants, support of the international community, the decision-making process, and relevance of the principles of peacekeeping are the most common causes impacting the outcome of the peace process," BARDALAI writes. "Furthermore, factors like the support of the UN Security Council, intensity of the debate therein, and funding for the operation also affect the peace process. However, unless there is coherence between the mandate, strategies, plans, programme initiatives, structures, processes and networks, a PKO cannot be a success."
Despite many studies undertaken to find ways to meet these challenges, BARDALAI asserts, nothing much has changed from Rwanda in 1994 to South Sudan in 2016. "This is because there is a huge gap between what is professed conceptually and how it is interpreted during its implementation. The way the basic principles of peacekeeping are interpreted is the biggest challenge impacting all PKOs and, most importantly, those nations who contribute with their peacekeepers in large numbers."
BARDALAI maintains that the subject of success and failures will remain an enigma because, first, defining success itself is a problem. Second, while there are common causes for success and failure, these vary from conflict to conflict.
Given the challenges and the slow progress in peacekeeping reform, the relevance of the PKOs will have to be examined in the context of availability of an alternate mechanism to restore normalcy in the conflict zone. In the absence of any other, better, substitute, he asserts, "it is reasonable to believe that UN PKOs are going to stay as one of the main alternatives for restoring peace in conflict zones."

To UN or Not to UN: The Question of Nordic UN Peacekeeping

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As the Cold War came to an end UN peacekeeping underwent a radical change. Its remit transformed from one of maintaining ceasefires to include multi-dimensional engagements in states emerging from war through a range of measures, including the deployment of soldiers, but also the organisation of elections and building of democratic institutions.
"For the Nordic countries, the UN of the 1990s represented a natural and attractive framework for supporting peace operations globally", according to a new policy brief by the DANISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (DIIS). Indeed, it appeared an ideal avenue for the outward promotion of values related to the Nordic welfare state model, which was considered a legitimate and worthwhile foreign policy objective in the early 1990s.
All the Nordic countries sharply reduced their contributions to UN peacekeeping operations after 1995, as events in Srebrenica in particular, but also the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, highlighted two major trends in peacekeeping. First, they demonstrated how quickly the UN had taken on a wide-ranging role in post-Cold War international conflict management, with a dramatic expansion in the number of missions and peacekeepers. Second, they showed the limitations of deploying lightly-armed peacekeepers in war zones who were only allowed to use force in self-defence. They proved unable to prevent mass killings in Srebrenica, and even had difficulty protecting themselves.
"Lack of robustness of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s drove the armed forces of the Nordic states away from the organisation," the DIIS stresses. "Ironically, the present expanded will of the UN to use force in peacekeeping operations contradicts what was the attraction of the UN framework immediately after the Cold War, namely its peaceful, neutral and non-violent approach to international conflicts. There is a strong sense among the Nordic states that the UN is not up to the task in Mali, and their hesitation has been reinforced, not eased, by engaging in the mission.
"However, as the only truly global organisation, it may also be the best option when it comes to solving matters of global peace and security. Making symbolic contributions is insufficient. This means that the Nordics must step up their UN game if they want to ensure its continued relevance."

The Dragon in Turtle Bay: The Impact of China’s Rise in the UN on the United States and Global Governance

China’s role in the United Nations is steadily rising at a time the United States is seeking burden-sharing and rethinking its multilateral leadership role. In this article, MARK P. LAGON and THERESA LOU highlight that China’s increasing role in three critical areas — (1) UN peacekeeping; (2) the work of the UN on human rights, particularly in the Human Rights Council; and (3) the governance of the digital realm and Internet freedom — has significant implications for U.S. interests and broader global governance efforts.
Although China’s transformation into a responsible stakeholder in various areas of the UN’s work could be promising, Beijing’s attempts to alter existing liberal norms bear close examination, they write. "As China boldly promotes its alternative vision for global governance, the United States needs to work with fellow market democracies to reaffirm and rededicate themselves to the liberal international order. Such collective action is a matter of interest, not altruism."
Those seeking a larger Chinese role in the UN might best be careful what they wish for, the authors contend. Despite the emergence of populism and some skepticism of multilateral arrangements in their domestic politics, the United States and like-minded nations have an interest in reinforcing liberal norms in these three areas of global governance and beyond.

New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century

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The most profound effect on the actual character of diplomacy of 21st century global changes is that public spheres are multiplying in modern states, especially in Western democracies, leading international academics, practitioners and observers stress in a new report.
“The fracturing of our societies, a process which is accelerating this century, has given rise to this fragmentation. Our homes, professional worlds, education, interests, experiences, and ideological orientations are increasingly differentiated,” according to the report titled New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century, published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
“Therefore in diplomacy we are engaging with and responding to an increasing variety of actors that span many different and coexisting public spheres. These diverse public spheres exist side by side, some­times without touching; they can also work together or collide and split into new particles of publics."
This process of pluralization is likely to intensify, stresses the report, edited by Volker Stanzel. It adds that the process affects a society not only from the inside, but also works inter-societally – that is, cross-border. “Consequently, foreign policy developments naturally become topics within the new publics. This is of course the case when foreign policy problems are simultaneously domestic concerns, but it can also happen if a public has an interest in events outside their country’s borders.”
The new publics therefore want to influence the implementation of foreign policy through diplomacy according to their topics of interest. “Thus, diplomacy no longer only acts purely intergovernmentally for the national goals of a country. Diplomacy must now explain and justify itself domestically and mediate between a state’s goals and the public’s perspectives.”
Publics may claim that a government should behave differently from what the political leadership wants; meanwhile, the government claims to represent the interests of the public properly. Even in autocratically ruled states, the disparity between governmental decisions and public values can be observed. These conflicts shatter the confidence of the public in their political leadership and can tear a society apart.
The report recommends that Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomats and governments in general should be proactive in four areas:
1. Diplomats must understand the tension between individual needs and state requirements, and engage with that tension without detriment to the state.
2. Digitization must be employed in such a way that gains in efficiency are not at the expense of efficacy.
3. Forms of mediation should be developed that reconcile the interests of all sides allowing governments to operate as sovereign states, and yet simul- taneously use the influence and potential of other actors.
4. New and more open state activities need to be advanced that respond to the ways in which emotionalized publics who wish to participate in governance express themselves.

Understanding State Preferences with Text as Data: Introducing the UN General Debate Corpus

World leaders have been gathering in New York City in late September every year to address the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to present their views on key international issues such as conflict and cooperation, terrorism, development and climate change. The statements of kings, presidents, prime ministers and other leaders are an invaluable and largely untapped source of information on governments’ policy preferences across a wide range of issues over time.
Government preferences are central to the study of international relations and comparative politics. As preferences cannot be directly observed, write ALEXANDER BATURO, NIHEER DASANDI and SLAVA J. MIKHAYLOV, they must be inferred from states’ observed behavior. Although military alliances have been used as an indicator of preference similarity, that approach provides little information about preferences when states do not have alliances. Scholars have instead overwhelmingly relied on UNGA voting records to estimate foreign policy preferences. However, UNGA voting-based methods – like all measures of preference – rely on certain assumptions and, as such, have both strengths and limitations. For example, one shortcoming is that estimates of state preference are derived from the limited number of issues that are voted on in the UNGA in a given year. Therefore, it is essential that researchers can draw on additional data and measures to avoid producing findings about government preferences that are based on one type of observed state behavior.
In their paper "Understanding state preferences with text as data: Introducing the UN General Debate corpus,” the authors argue that the application of text analytic methods to general debate statements can provide much-needed additional measures and tools that can broaden our understanding of government preferences and their effects. The use of text analytic methods is rapidly gaining ground in comparative politics and legislative studies. To date, however, there has been little effort to use speeches to estimate policy preferences in international relations. The formal and institutionalized setting of the general debate, its inclusion of all UN member states, which are provided with equal opportunity to address the Assembly, and the fact that it takes place every year, makes it an ideal resource from which to derive, using text analysis, estimates of state preferences that can be applied to systematic analyses of international politics.
The authors introduce a new dataset, the UN General Debate corpus (UNGDC), consisting of 7314 general debate statements delivered between 1970-2014, that they have preprocessed, categorized and prepared for empirical applications. They begin by discussing the characteristics, content and purpose of the UN general debate and go on to explain the process of collecting and preprocessing the statements and provide an overview of the UNGDC.
The authors then use the text as data approach to show how the UNGDC can be used as a resource from which estimates of government preferences can be derived, providing applications of these estimates. The paper concludes by outlining potential uses of the UNGDC in future research.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Environmental Sustainability

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) are deployed to create, maintain, and secure peace in countries and regions struggling with violence and war. The environmental sustainability of UNPKO mission sites is not essential to the purpose of each deployment, but good sustainability practices can benefit the mission, host nation, troop-contributing countries, and the global environment. As a major contributor to UNPKO efforts, the United States has a direct interest in improving the sustainability and cost-effectiveness of each mission.
In this paper, PHILIP STOCKDALE, REBEKAH KIRKWOOD, JULIE SAPP and JONATHAN DANIEL identify gaps in sustainability practices at local and organizational levels and
recommend an increased focus on sustainability practices that can benefit the mission, host nation, troop contributing countries, and the environment.
The United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a long-term mission, likely to be in place for at least another five years. Investments in active technologies such as solar energy and electric vehicles are already paying dividends. Expansion of these programs, as well as standardized environmental awareness training and improvements to UNIFIL’s water management practices would enhance the sustainability of the mission.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a relatively recent mission, staffed with a high proportion of illiterate peacekeepers, in a politically unstable country with a harsh natural environment. Although required by Security Council resolution to manage its environmental impact, MINUSMA lacks the financial resources, manpower and timeline to invest in complex technologies with up-front cost. To comply with its environmental mandate, the mission should implement short-term, passive measures to improve water management and solar/thermal protection, as well as
standardized environmental awareness training. If the situation in Mali stabilizes and MINUSMA is extended to a longer mandate, then the mission should follow the lead of UNIFIL and implement active technologies that are environmentally friendly and will save money over the life of the equipment.
All of these recommendations can be applied, to some extent, to all UNPKO deployments. UN
headquarters should take the lead in standardizing environmental training, technology and practices for all UNPKO missions. Cost-benefit calculations will always be important, but the overall benefit of good sustainability practices will extend to people and the environment from the local to the global level.

Choose Your Partner Wisely: Regional Actors in Crisis Management

China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since the 2000s

Strengthening Multilateralism and the Role of the UN

On Friday (November 9) the United Nations Security Council is planning to hold an open debate on “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”. China, as President of the Council for November, has circulated a concept note in advance of the discussions:

- How to better uphold multilateralism? The most basic principle of multilateralism is that when dealing with matters in the international arena, it is necessary to uphold fairness, justice and the participation of all countries in discussing actions to be taken; actions must be taken in accordance with rules agreed upon by all; and the interests and concerns of all countries must be taken into account. Currently the international environment is becoming increasingly unstable and uncertain. Countries need to engage in in-depth discussions on how to adapt to the trend of the times, how to foster unity and cooperation, and how to enhance mutual understanding and trust.

- How to further promote the role of the United Nations? The United Nations is a critical pillar of multilateralism. In the new environment, we must ask how we can better uphold and carry forward the purposes and principles of the Charter; how we can deepen coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations; and how we can better support the central role of the United Nations in international affairs and make the Organization relevant to all people.

- How to effectively address global challenges? Global challenges such as terrorism and risks to cybersecurity loom ever larger, requiring countries to formulate a coherent strategy and take collective action. How can we more effectively safeguard this collective mechanism? How can we promote peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, consultation and the path of political settlement? How can we enhance the role of United Nations peacekeeping operations in ensuring lasting peace and sustainable development?

Will International Institutions Fail Again?

Unpacking The Competing Russian and US Cyberspace Resolutions at the United Nations

Engaging with Non-state Armed Groups to Protect Civilians: A Pragmatic Approach for UN Peace Operations

Proximity and the Effectiveness of Peacekeepers

UN Reforms for the 2030 Agenda

Mission Impossible? United Nations Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen

Towards Climate Resilient Peacebuilding: Understanding the Complexities

Is the World on the Road to Peace or War?

Improving Peacekeeping Performance: Dilemmas and Goals

Predictive Peacekeeping: Opportunities and Challenges

The Contradictory Logics of International Intervention

The League of Legends: An Exploratory Public Service Bargain Analysis of United Nations Secretaries-General

Reforming the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Organized Crime on the UN Security Council Agenda

Unpacking the UN Secretary-General’s Strategy on New Technologies

United Nations: The Price of Order?

Action for Peacekeeping: Making Good on Shared Commitments

Donald Trump at the United Nations General Assembly

Action for Peacekeeping: Will Political Consensus Lead to Change in Practice?

What Happens at the UN General Assembly?

Peacekeeping Budget Approval and Cuts Leave Fundamental Questions Unaddressed

Outlining American Interests at the United Nations General Assembly

The Role of UN Peacekeeping in China's Expanding Strategic Interests

Do the SDGs Matter for Real People?

Approaches by the United Nations Security Council P5 to the Charter's Article 39 Concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’

See How Much You Know About the United Nations

The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Middle East

Global Peace Needs an Updated UN Charter

Fragile States and the Prospects for Global Peace in Troubled Times

United Nations Peacekeeping and Internal Legitimacy

How a European Security Council Could Strengthen EU Foreign Policy

Corruption: Symptom and Consequence of Today’s Fractured World

Understanding the Relationship Between Corruption and Conflict

'Peace' in Pieces: The Tragedy of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan

United Nations Peace Operations in Complex Environments: Charting the Right Course

Shifts in the Middle East Balance of Power: An Historical Perspective

Prospects for UN Renovation and Reform

How Do UN Sanctions Affect Mediation Processes?

Myanmar’s Stalled Transition

Syria: A State Forever Changed

With DRC Election in December, MONUSCO, Squeezed by Political and Budgetary Pressures, Labors On

China as a Conflict Mediator

The ISIS Phenomenon: South Asia and Beyond

Nailing Down the Primacy of Politics in United Nations Peacekeeping: An Insider Perspective

Does the UN Need a Military Capability for World Peace and Security?

The UN’s Role in a Changing Global Landscape

Can China’s Belt and Road Initiative Help Achieve the SDGs?

The European Union’s Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Four Key Challenges

Making the United Nations Fit for Purpose in an Illiberal Era

The Role of UN PKOs in Monitoring Illicit Arms Flows

From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism

Unlocking the Riddle of UN Reform for the 21st Century and Beyond

Syrian Refugee Children: Increasing Understanding With Empirical Evidence

Colombia's Peace Deal: Death by Bad Implementation?

Somalia: AMISOM and Contemporary Peace Enforcement

Middle East Peace: What ‘Deal’, What Leadership, What Resistance?

Return to Peaceful Myanmar? Letting Go of an Illusion

How Lebanon’s Disengagement From the Syrian Civil War Changed Violence in the Country

Building on Afghanistan’s Fleeting Ceasefire

New Priorities for International Counter-terrorism

The 12th UN-AU Peace and Security Meeting: Critical Drivers

Building a Better UN-AU Peacekeeping Partnership

United Nations-African Union Cooperation: A New Period of Partnerships?

Why the New United Nations Panel on Digital Cooperation Should Focus on Inequality

The Future of the United Nations Development System

To Stabilize Libya, Redistribute Oil Revenue