A classic, successful DDR scenario, especially after a divisive civil war, involves standing down the combatant irregulars, collecting up their weapons, and implementing programs to ease their path back to civilian life, or integrating them as part of the regular armed forces, he states. All of this should be done within the context of, and by reinforcing, a comprehensive peace agreement, which is usually overseen by international powers given the lack of trust that normally prevails.
None of this applies to the Syrian case, HAID writes. “In the place of a nationwide negotiated peace agreement, there has been a series of half-hearted reconciliations imposed by the regime after besieging and battering rebel strongholds into submission.”
Reintegrating irregulars, be they pro-regime militias or former rebels, into the regime forces has taken place piecemeal and not as part of an integrated national program of rehabilitation. In neither case have mechanisms been set up to help former fighters adjust to civilian life.
In addition, there are many obstacles that have been highlighted by the efforts so far made, HAID continues. “Turning a civilian militia fighter with no formal training or discipline into a reliable soldier requires an investment of manpower and finance that the regime lacks.” Simply adopting entire loyalist or rebel units may temporarily solve some problems but does not amount to serious reintegration.
Lacking professional training, discipline, and regular command structures, and in many cases maintaining divided loyalties, these forces can be of only limited utility and dependability for the regime. It has also done nothing to reform its military and security forces and eliminate the sectarianism prevailing throughout: these forces remain corrupt, brutal, and incompetent, factors that will further bedevil reintegration and trust building.
As beholden as the regime is to Iran and Russia for its survival, HAID writes, it has not been able to resist the inroads into state sovereignty and the implanting of foreign influence represented by the apparently competitive sponsorship of elements in the military and security structures.
“That process may provide a temporary fix for the regime’s financial and manpower deficits, but in the long term it will complicate any true attempt at national reconstruction and reintegration. It could potentially turn the country’s military and security fields into an arena for regional and international power contests, if they are not already.”
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