The Charm Offensive: Peacekeeping and Policy in China

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By MARISSA GIBSON

China is already a regional great power and as it continues to expand economically, politically, and militarily, it must be careful to retain its image as a peaceful state concerned with international peace, security, and harmonious co-existence, writes
Based upon this analysis, China has undergone a significant change since the 1970s and as it has opened its doors to the international community it has emerged as a rapidly developing power. Its relationship with peacekeeping has demonstrated that even its strict beliefs about sovereignty and non-intervention can be bent in some circumstances, as seen by its actions with respect to Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, and Sudan. Peacekeeping has allowed China to project the image of an atypical and responsible power that is deeply concerned with the maintenance and protection of international peace and security. Chinese peacekeeping troops have “…built and repaired over 8,700 km of roads and 270 bridges, cleared over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transported over 600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million km, and treated 79,000 patients.”63 This is a far cry from the days of refusing to vote on peacekeeping resolutions and the denial of financial and troop contributions.
As Chinese foreign policy has broadened, peacekeeping has reflected these changes. Its image as a responsible power and its increasing flexibility regarding the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention have been demonstrated in its increasing participation in peacekeeping operations. China’s approach to modern peacekeeping is consistent with that of a middle power in its policy development, which has been defined as professing a multilateral approach to building peace, a willingness to compromise, an understanding of middle-power limitations, and a tendency to take a targeted approach to international problems through a ‘helpful fixer’ role.64 Its focus upon peaceful development is supplemented by its PKO participation.
Finally, peacekeeping provides an opportunity to gain operational experience for the PLA, although it is certainly more limited than the experience that could be gained through armed conflict. Military-to-military dialogue and cooperation, the development of military capabilities, and military modernization have all improved due to participation in peacekeeping. China’s defence policy continues to reaffirm its commitment to sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful development – all of which is seen in its behaviour regarding PKOs. With little conventional experience in warfare, peacekeeping provides ‘boots on the ground’ knowledge and military power projection that does not exacerbate the China threat theory.
In summation, peacekeeping has provided a platform for China to expand its global presence in a relatively non-threatening manner, to build relationships with other nations, and to develop its military capabilities. China’s peacekeeping interests are not wholly altruistic however, and there is much to be gained from the peacekeeping foothold established in Africa, including the possibility of lucrative trade agreements with resource-rich nations. Nonetheless, China remains an actor that is motivated by careful consideration of the costs and benefits of its peacekeeping deployment, as evidenced by Darfur, and will likely continue to do so in order to maintain its international standing among global powers such as the U.S. and Russia. It will be interesting to track its continuing investment in PKOs in the coming years and whether or not China will consider providing support for ‘coalitions-of-the-willing’ as a means to increase its standing among the international community.

The preceding text is the conclusion of Second Lieutenant Marissa Gibson's article 'The Charm Offensive: Peacekeeping and Policy in China' published in the Canadian Military Journal Vol. 19, No. 1.

Peacekeeping After Brexit

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What is the state of the United Kingdom’s current engagement with the UN, where might this go in the future, and what possible impacts would leaving the European Union have on the ability for the UK to influence the United Nations’ actions on a political level?
These were among the questions raised at a roundtable on September 7, 2018 at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Organized by the British International Studies Association Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Working Group in partnership with RUSI, the roundtable took as its starting point the broader question of the role of multilateral institutions in UK foreign and defense policy after the UK formally leaves the EU, and sought to identify and understand the role of peace operations within the framework of the ‘Global Britain’ agenda.
Some 30 delegates from academia and the policy and NGO sectors provided perspectives on how different forms of engagement with UN peace operations could strengthen the UK government’s commitment to supporting a rules-based international system.
A challenge underlying the roundtable was that the UK has yet to formally leave the EU, write DAVID CURRAN GEORGINA HOLMES and PHILIP CUNLIFFE in this conference report capturing the key themes and issues raised by the participants.
Related to this was the limited understanding (beyond Global Britain) as to the UK’s current foreign policy objectives, and what role the UN plays in them. “There appears to be little policy which indicates how approaches to the UN will alter as a result of Brexit,” according to the report.
There is a need for a cross-governmental strategy to guide how the UK engages with UN operations, and the extent to which the UK could maintain or build upon its present commitment after 2020, the roundtable heard.
The UK has built a modest but strong base of engagement in the field through UN Mission in South Sudan. When placed alongside the UK’s political activities in the UN Security Council, and having effective people in key positions, the opportunity for stepping up engagement is clear. This, however, should be undertaken in a coordinated manner, based on where the UK can best complement UN requirements, the participants stressed.

Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War

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Over the last two decades, international actors have devoted increasing attention to managing intrastate conflicts. A substantial body of research has suggested that various efforts can make significant contributions to the resolution of such conflict. Despite these efforts, however, a large number of civil wars are still fought.
Analysis by KYLE BEARDSLEY, DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, and PETER B. WHITE suggests that the positive effect of international efforts is not limited to conflict resolution. Rather, peacekeeping and mediation can actually reduce the level of killing in ongoing wars as well as resolve them, they write in an article titled ‘Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War’ published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Although previous work has explored the relationship between peacekeeping and conflict severity, the authors state that their study is the first to show a violence-reducing effect of mediation and the first to examine the interactive effect of mediation and peacekeeping.
“These findings are important because they suggest that international actions have a violence-reducing effect that has, with the exception of peacekeeping, to date been unrecognized,” the authors contend. Many of the conflicts that receive the most international attention – such as those in Syria and South Sudan – are incredibly bloody, and the level of violence can suggest that the ability of third parties to do anything constructive is limited. “Our analyses suggest, however, that, on average, civil wars would be even bloodier without international efforts,” the authors state.
The presence of severe armed conflict in the face of international intervention does not necessarily represent the categorical failure of international efforts.
The results suggest that scholars and policy makers evaluating the success of international efforts should use a broader metric than conflict resolution. To fully gauge the effectiveness of third-party efforts, researchers should examine the severity of violence as well. This is particularly important in the context of analyses that suggest that strategies such as peacekeeping and mediation may lead to a short-term decrease in hostilities at the cost of potential conflict recurrence. This trade-off may very well exist but determining whether these strategies are still worthwhile requires fully understanding the impact they have on the dynamics of conflict, such as the level of violence.
The authors state that their analysis also suggests that efficacy in third-party efforts requires the investment of significant resources. “We did not find much of a pacifying effect for indirect mediation. Rather, direct mediation and concurrent deployments of UN peacekeepers – both of which require substantial attention and commitment –have the largest effects. Much of the discussion of conflict management efforts by states and bodies such as the UN focuses on the costs, and these costs can be substantial. We show that the benefits can be as well.”

Supporting Peace After Civil War: What Kind of International Engagement Can Make a Difference?

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How can international actors effectively support peace after civil war?
Analyzing combinations of peace support provided during the first five years of 36 post-civil war episodes since 1990, CHARLOTTE FIEDLER, JÖRN GRÄVINGHOLT and KARINA MROSS conclude that international peacebuilding can clearly make a difference. More specifically, their findings show that:
• contrary to concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of democratization, the majority of successful cases are in fact characterized by substantial international support in the field of politics and governance in democratizing contexts;
• only combined international efforts across all types of support can help prevent renewed conflict in contexts of a high risk of recurrence; and
• countries that did not receive any substantial peace support experienced conflict recurrence within five years.
In a briefing paper titled Supporting Peace After Civil War: What Kind of International Engagement Can Make a Difference? for the German Development Institute, the authors recommend the following to the international community when faced with post-civil war situations:
• Engage substantially in post-conflict countries. International peacebuilding can be effective, even where there is a high structural risk of conflict recurrence. While success will never be guaranteed, countries that receive substantial international support often remain peaceful, whereas all countries that were neglected by the international community experienced conflict recurrence.
• Pay particular attention, and provide substantial support, to the field of politics and governance in post-conflict countries that begin to democratize. While it is well known that democratization processes are conflict prone, donor engagement geared towards supporting such processes can help mitigate conflict and contribute to peace. When a post-conflict country has decided to embark on political reforms donors should offer governance support to help overcome potential destabilizing effects of democratization processes.
• Invest in an international approach that encompasses all areas of peacebuilding early on after the end of a civil war. Especially in contexts with a high structural risk of renewed violent conflict, the chances of sustained peace are increased by simultaneous support for security, institutions, livelihoods and societal conflict transformation.

Reintegrating Syrian Militias: Mechanisms, Actors, and Shortfalls

The process of reintegrating Syrian militias or rebels into the regime forces needs to happen as part of an integrated national program of rehabilitation, writes HAID HAID in an article for the Carnegie Middle East Center.

A classic, successful DDR scenario, especially after a divisive civil war, involves standing down the combatant irregulars, collecting up their weapons, and implementing programs to ease their path back to civilian life, or integrating them as part of the regular armed forces, he states. All of this should be done within the context of, and by reinforcing, a comprehensive peace agreement, which is usually overseen by international powers given the lack of trust that normally prevails.

None of this applies to the Syrian case, HAID writes. “In the place of a nationwide negotiated peace agreement, there has been a series of half-hearted reconciliations imposed by the regime after besieging and battering rebel strongholds into submission.” 

Reintegrating irregulars, be they pro-regime militias or former rebels, into the regime forces has taken place piecemeal and not as part of an integrated national program of rehabilitation. In neither case have mechanisms been set up to help former fighters adjust to civilian life.

In addition, there are many obstacles that have been highlighted by the efforts so far made, HAID continues. “Turning a civilian militia fighter with no formal training or discipline into a reliable soldier requires an investment of manpower and finance that the regime lacks.” Simply adopting entire loyalist or rebel units may temporarily solve some problems but does not amount to serious reintegration. 

Lacking professional training, discipline, and regular command structures, and in many cases maintaining divided loyalties, these forces can be of only limited utility and dependability for the regime. It has also done nothing to reform its military and security forces and eliminate the sectarianism prevailing throughout: these forces remain corrupt, brutal, and incompetent, factors that will further bedevil reintegration and trust building.

As beholden as the regime is to Iran and Russia for its survival, HAID writes, it has not been able to resist the inroads into state sovereignty and the implanting of foreign influence represented by the apparently competitive sponsorship of elements in the military and security structures. 

“That process may provide a temporary fix for the regime’s financial and manpower deficits, but in the long term it will complicate any true attempt at national reconstruction and reintegration. It could potentially turn the country’s military and security fields into an arena for regional and international power contests, if they are not already.”

The African Union and Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Burundi

Amid Burundi’s intensifying domestic crisis in December 2015, the African Union (AU) took the unprecedented step of threatening to use military force against the government’s will in order to protect civilians caught up in the conflict.
In an article for the Journal of Modern African Studies, posted by Brussels-based EGMONT The Royal Institute for International Relations, NINA WILÉN and PAUL D. WILLIAMS trace the background to this decision and analyze the effectiveness and credibility of the AU’s use of coercive diplomacy as a tool of conflict management.
After its usual range of conflict management tools failed to stem the Burundian crisis, the AU Commission and Peace and Security Council (PSC) tried a new type of military compellence by invoking Article 4(h) of the Union’s Constitutive Act. The authors argue that the threatened intervention never materialized because of 1) the Burundian government’s astute diplomacy and 2) several African autocrats’ resistance to setting a precedent for future interventions where concerns about civilian protection overrode state sovereignty.
But this was not a complete defeat for the AU, WILÉN and WILLIAMS state. “The Burundi case showed the AU Commission was willing and able to address an impending crisis that directly related to its mandate to prevent violent conflicts.”
From late 2014, the AU used various diplomatic instruments, including the deployment of special envoys, a high-level panel and later, human right observers and military experts. When these failed to persuade the Burundian government to open negotiations, the PSC used targeted sanctions to try and diffuse the crisis. “The PSC’s unprecedented invocation of Article 4(h) in the immediate aftermath of the deadly episode of 11-12 December 2015 was an innovative attempt to reduce violence against civilians and put pressure on the government when all previous measures had failed.”
Yet, the AU did not directly tackle the principal cause of Burundi’s crisis: President Nkurunziza’s controversial bid for a third term. It seems clear that most observers, including the EAC’s ministers of justice and the chairperson of the AU Commission viewed a third term for Nkurunziza as unconstitutional and it certainly broke the terms of the Arusha agreement, for which the AU was a guarantor. Yet the AU’s room for maneuver was constrained for two main reasons. First, the May 2015 ruling by Burundi’s Constitutional Court in favor of Nkurunziza’s third term meant that legally, Nkurunziza’s continued rule was constitutional, despite the serious doubts about the Court’s independence reflected by the vice-president’s decision to flee the country immediately after the verdict was delivered.
Second, the EAC’s leaders were unwilling to criticize the extension of presidential term limits in Burundi given their similar behavior in their own states. Discussion of this issue was effectively killed off when the East African Community (EAC) gained the lead role for mediating the negotiations to resolve Burundi’s crisis.
The decision not to forcibly deploy the African Protection and Prevention Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) without the host government’s consent shows the abiding power of the norm of non-intervention and the controversial nature of Article 4(h) in Africa, despite the AU’s new unofficial slogan of moving ‘from non-intervention to non-indifference’.
“The decision also showed how there can be different dynamics for the PSC convening at ambassadorial level compared to meetings at the level of heads of state or foreign ministers,” the authors state.
In retrospect, the decision not to deploy MAPROBU also made it easier for the government of Burundi to reject the deployment of a UN police mission, which was established in UN Security Council resolution 2303 of 29 July 2016. It has also probably reduced the AU’s credibility should it wish to issue a similar compellent threat in the future. On the other hand, it is possible that the PSC’s threat of Article 4(h) helped prevent an even worse spiral of violence that might have occurred after the clashes in mid-December 2015 and that a forcible military intervention might have escalated Burundi’s crisis regardless of the good intentions behind it.

MINIMUM ORDER: The Role of the UN Security Council in an Era of Major Power Competition

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Amid the uncertainty surrounding the future of international relations, what role can the United Nations Security Council play?
In exploring what the body can do in managing geopolitical tensions in the future, RICHARD GOWAN frames the problems the United Nations is facing differently.
In a new report published by the United Nations University Center for Policy Research, GOWAN aims to identify the minimum level of P5 cooperation necessary for the Security Council to play a significant role in managing major power competition, and how to preserve this minimum.
The United Nations has never suffered from a shortage of proposals for how to improve the Security Council, he writes. Experts began tabling ideas to overcome P5 divisions in the early 1950s. “History has shown that technical roadmaps for resolving the council’s problems normally disappear into diplomatic oblivion.”
In the report, titled ‘MINIMUM ORDER: The role of the Security Council in an era of major power competition’, offers a diagnosis of how poorly the Council is faring as well as a warning about where this may lead. “There is little political point in outlining overly precise terms of a solution to these problems, given the intensity and complexity of the divisions and the crises currently in play,” he writes. “Rather than conclude with specific recommendations, therefore, it may be better to end with a challenge.”
It is clear from current Council dynamics that the forum is drifting towards a situation in which it fails to maintain its basic post-Cold War roles, GOWAN contends. “It is equally evident that this bears significant risks for the P5, even if their behavior does not reflect this.”
The basic challenge for the P5 is to recognize the fragility of their position and to address the need to restore some stability within the council before matters deteriorate much further. It would be useful if P5 members were to initiate – quietly or publicly – some sort of strategic dialogue about how to maintain the basic functions of the council in policing non-proliferation, easing crises and dealing with terrorists. Such a dialogue might be linked to handling specific problems, like the aftermath of the Syrian war, or promoting specific P5-branded initiatives to restore faith in aspects of the non-proliferation regime. “Exactly what such a process should look like is something for all members of the P5 to discuss. This report is a prompt for them to do so.”
If P5 governments are not open to a worthwhile formal strategic dialogue at this time – and their actions suggest that they are not – it may be necessary for security institutes from the five to start probing these questions in a preparatory fashion, GOWAN states. “This may be a long, painful and perhaps quixotic process. The decline of Security Council diplomacy is real, and the need for some sort of vision of what can be salvaged from the mess is growing ever more urgent.”