Beyond the Veto: Roles in UN Security Council Decision-Making

The formal rules governing the UN Security Council offer little insight into how negotiations are conducted on a day-to-day basis. While it is generally assumed that permanent members dominate negotiations, JESS GIFKINS investigates avenues for influence for elected members and the UN Secretariat. 

Institutional power is used to show how permanent members adopt dominant positions in negotiations extending far beyond their Charter-given privileges, he writes in the journal Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations. 

Dominance of permanent members is moderated, however, by the legitimacy that support from elected members brings to a resolution. Similarly, the UN Secretariat can use its legitimated authority to influence decisions. 

In his article, ‘Beyond the Veto: Roles in UN Security Council Decision-Making’, GIFKINS argues that informal practices are key in understanding how power and influence are allocated in the Council and it forms a building block for future analyses of Security Council practices. This argument also has implications for the perennial reform debates and the prospects for informal reform.

Gifkins, J. (2021). Beyond the Veto, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27(1), 1-24. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701003